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ABSTRACT 
 
Since the inception of modern international criminal law (ICL), 
scholars have considered the issue of potential ICL accountability 
predicated on mass famine situations.  Despite this interest, the sub-
ject of famine has remained mostly outside the scope of ICL practice 
to date.  This article revisits the question of potential intersections 
between ICL and modern famines.  In doing so, recent real-world 
famines in Cambodia, North Korea, Somalia and Darfur, along with 
the current threat of famine amidst the ongoing civil war in Syria are 
referenced as examples of potential situations warranting the pur-
suit of ICL accountability.  These and other examples of modern 
famine demonstrate that the creation, enforcement or perpetuation 
of famine represents a modality of harm causation through which 
various international crimes may be committed.  Depending on the 
circumstances such crimes may take the form of genocide, war 
crimes and/or crimes against humanity.  After providing an over-
view of promising ICL entry points for the pursuit of famine ac-
countability, this article suggests that famine harms have been 
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largely excluded from the purview of ICL primarily because of per-
sistent outdated understandings of the dynamics of famine causa-
tion, and the fact that famine situations fail to conform to precon-
ceived notions of what constitutes an atrocity event.  In order to 
push back against such preconceptions, this article suggests that 
famine is better conceptualized as a means or modality through 
which atrocities may be committed, rather than trying to describe 
the condition of famine itself as amounting to an international crime. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
True famines1 are periods of horror and social rupture, involving 
mass trauma and death.2  For centuries, these tragedies were domi-
nantly conceptualized in Malthusian terms, as products of overpop-
ulation, natural disaster, or some other cause of reduction in per cap-
ita food production.3  Today, scholars largely agree that famines are 
not unforeseeable natural disasters, but are the largely predictable 
by-products of political and economic causes.4  In this new era of 
understanding famines as primarily attributable to human agency, 
certain scholars have proposed that international criminal law (ICL) 
should play some role in responding to especially flagrant famine-
inducing behavior.5  This question, of the relationship between ICL 
                                                      
1 For the purposes of this article, the term “famine” is used to denote situations 
during which there is a significant increase in death rates amongst a population 
lacking access to sufficient food.  For an overview of the various competing defini-
tions of famine, see Paul Howe & Stephen Devereux, Famine Scales: Towards an In-
strumental Definition of “Famine,” in THE NEW FAMINES: WHY FAMINES PERSIST IN AN 
ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 27, 29–35 (Stephen Devereux ed., 2007). 
2 CORMAC Ó GRÁDA, FAMINE: A SHORT HISTORY 45–63 (2009) (describing the 
“horrors” of famine). 
3 Early famine scholarship was heavily influenced by the work of Thomas Mal-
thus, who viewed famine and the spread of disease as the largely inevitable results 
of unchecked population growth.  For a brief overview of Malthus’ work and its 
legacy for famine studies, see Stephen Devereux, Introduction, in THE NEW FAMINES: 
WHY FAMINES PERSIST IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 1, supra note 1, at 5–6. 
4 See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Ingredients of Famine Analysis: Availability and Entitle-
ments, 96 Q. J. ECON. 433 (1981) (studying how people use legal means to control 
food); ALEX DE WAAL, FAMINE CRIMES: POLITICS AND THE DISASTER RELIEF INDUSTRY IN 
AFRICA (1997) (describing how political acts create famine); Ó GRÁDA, supra note 2, 
at 1–13 (stating that major famines in the modern era are more often caused by po-
litical factors and human activity than by nature).  Indeed, locating responsibility 
for famine causation is a major theme in recent famine scholarship.  In a 2007 book 
introduction, Stephen Devereux identifies “responsibility for famine causation and 
accountability for famine prevention” as recurring themes in contemporary famine 
scholarship.  Devereux, Introduction, supra note 3, at 13.  This generalization is not 
meant to suggest that there is any one universally agreed upon paradigm of famine, 
but simply that there exists a more general movement within famine studies away 
from Malthusian or natural disaster paradigms and towards those focused on hu-
man action as the driving force behind famine causation. 
5 See, e.g., David Marcus, Famine Crimes in International Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 
245 (2003); Grace M. Kang, A Case for the Prosecution of Kim Jong II for Crimes Against 
Humanity, Genocide, and War Crimes, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 51 (2006); Jenny 
Edkins, The Criminalization of Mass Starvations: From Natural Disaster to Crime Against 
Humanity, in THE NEW FAMINES: WHY FAMINES PERSIST IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, 
supra note 1, at 50; J. Solomon Bashi, Prosecuting Starvation in the Extraordinary Cham-
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
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and famine, is fundamentally interdisciplinary in nature, sitting at 
the intersection of famine studies, demography, international law, 
and international relations.  Partially as a result of this interdiscipli-
nary reality, scholars often talk past one another using unfamiliar 
technical language and continue to be divided over the degree to 
which existing provisions of ICL provide adequate coverage over 
famine-causing behaviour versus the need for the creation of new, 
famine-specific international crimes.6 
As this abstract scholarly debate has evolved, activists, journal-
ists, and scholars have proposed that various real-world famines, 
both contemporary and historical, be conceptualized as interna-
tional crimes.  Prominent examples include the Ukrainian Holodomor 
(“extermination by hunger”) famine under Soviet rule from 1932-
                                                      
bers in the Courts of Cambodia, 29 WIS. INT’L L.J. 34 (2011); Randle C. DeFalco, Ac-
counting for Famine at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: The Crimes 
Against Humanity of Extermination, Inhumane Acts and Persecution, 5 INT’L J. 
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 142 (2011); Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, State-Induced Famine 
and Penal Starvation in North Korea, 7 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENT. 147 (2012); Jens 
David Ohlin, Opinion, Somalia Famine ‘Crime against Humanity’?, CNN (Aug. 12, 
2011), 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/08/12/ohlin.somalia.crimes/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/J6QF-CLR3].  Alex de Waal has similarly argued for the concep-
tualization of mass famine in Darfur as crimes, but has recently reconsidered his 
position, due to practical concerns related to how such treatment may inhibit the 
delivery of aid.  DE WAAL, FAMINE CRIMES, supra note 4; cf. Alex de Waal, Reflections 
on the Difficulties of Defining Darfur’s Crisis as Genocide, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 25 
(2007) (finding that labeling the Sudanese crisis as a genocide implies moral con-
demnation and limits the range of solutions); Alex de Waal, On Famine Crimes and 
Tragedies, 372 THE LANCET 1538 (2008) (finding that criminalizing famine while a 
crisis is ongoing can interfere with humanitarian relief work). 
6 For example, in a 2003 article, David Marcus argued that international crim-
inal law provided only “patch-work” coverage, primarily in the form of crimes 
against humanity, over common famine scenarios and concluded that the prefera-
ble way forward would be to amend the Rome Statute to include famine-specific 
crimes.  Marcus, supra note 5, at 247.  Meanwhile, certain scholars view famine 
through the rubric of genocide.  For example, Helen Fein, Sheri Rosenberg, and 
Everita Silina include the enforcement of starvation conditions as one method of 
what they refer to as “genocide by attrition.”  See Helen Fein, Genocide by Attrition 
1939-1993: The Warsaw Ghetto, Cambodia, and Sudan: Links between Human Rights, 
Health, and Mass Death, 2 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 10 (1997) (describing how the gov-
ernment withheld food from the south Sudanese); Sheri P. Rosenberg & Everita 
Silina, Genocide by Attrition: Silent and Efficient, in GENOCIDE MATTERS: ONGOING 
ISSUES AND EMERGING PERSPECTIVES 106, 116–18 (Joyce Apsel & Ernesto Verdeja eds., 
2013) (describing Stalin’s deprivation of food to Ukrainians as a means of gradually 
committing mass murder). 
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1933;7 the Chinese famine of 1958-1962;8 the Khmer Rouge era Cam-
bodian famine of 1975-1979;9 the Ethiopian famine of 1983-1985;10 
the Somali famine of 2010-2012;11 and recurrent famine conditions in 
Darfur12 and North Korea13 in recent decades.  Amongst these exam-
ples, recent or recurring famine conditions in North Korea, Darfur, 
                                                      
7 See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 5, at 252–55; Nicolas Werth, Keynote Address for 
the Holodomor Conference, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 17–18 Novem-
ber 2008, 30 HARV. UKR. STUD. xxix, xxix–xxxviii (2008); Renate Stark, Holodomor, 
Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933: A Crime against Humanity or Genocide?, 10 IR. J. APPL. 
SOC. STUD. 20 (2010); Rebekah Moore, “A Crime Against Humanity Arguably Without 
Parallel in European History”: Genocide and the “Politics” of Victimhood in Western Nar-
ratives of the Ukrainian Holodomor, 58 AUST. J. POLIT. HIST. 367 (2012). For a factual 
overview of this famine, see ROBERT CONQUEST, THE HARVEST OF SORROW: SOVIET 
COLLECTIVIZATION AND THE TERROR-FAMINE (1986). 
8 See, e.g., Eamon Aloyo, Improving Global Accountability: The ICC and Nonviolent 
Crimes against Humanity, 2 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 498, 504-05 (2013) (charac-
terizing Mao Zedong’s policies that caused widespread famine as a crime against 
humanity).  For one historical account of this famine, see FRANK DIKÖTTER, MAO’S 
GREAT FAMINE: THE HISTORY OF CHINA’S MOST DEVASTATING CATASTROPHE, 1958-
1962 (2011). 
9 DeFalco, Accounting for Famine, supra note 5; Bashi, supra note 5. For a factual 
overview of this famine, see Randle C. DeFalco, Justice and Starvation in Cambodia: 
The Khmer Rouge Famine, 2 CAMBODIA L. & POL’Y J. 45 (2014). 
10 See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 5, at 255–59; DE WAAL, supra note 4.  For an over-
view of recent domestic accountability efforts in relation to the period during which 
this famine occurred, see Firew Kebede Tiba, The Mengistu Genocide Trial in Ethiopia, 
5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 513 (2007). 
11 See, e.g., Matt Bryden, Somalia’s Famine is Not Just a Catastrophe, It’s a Crime, 
THE ENOUGH PROJECT (Oct. 2011), http://www.enoughproject.org/files/Bry-
den_SomaliaFamine%20Brief_final_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9BC-MLGQ] (de-
scribing Al-Shabaab’s exacerbation of famine conditions in Somalia); Ohlin, supra 
note 5 (reporting on the developing famine in Somalia and Al-Shabaab’s “policy of 
preventing civilians from leaving their territory”).  While Bryden and Ohlin suggest 
that the militant group Al-Shabaab may be responsible for international crimes in 
relation to this famine, journalist Alex Perry has argued that the Somali govern-
ment, at the behest of the United States, committed the war crime of using starva-
tion of civilians as a weapon to weaken Al-Shabaab’s influence in famine-afflicted 
areas.  See Anna Maria Tremonti, Somalia 2011 Famine Was a U.S.-Created War Crime, 
THE CURRENT (Jan. 18, 2016), http://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-
for-january-18-2016-1.3408273/somalia-2011-famine-was-a-u-s-created-war-crime-
says-journalist-alex-perry-1.3408302 [https://perma.cc/XL4W-53UJ] (summariz-
ing Alex Perry’s findings from his 2011 investigation in Somalia).  Approximately 
260,000 victims died in the 2010-2012 Somali famine.  Somalia Famine ‘killed 260,000 
people’, BBC (May 2, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22380352 
[https://perma.cc/FX2A-HR2V]. 
12 See, e.g., de Waal, Reflections, supra note 5; Eric Reeves, Humanitarian Obstruc-
tion as a Crime Against Humanity: The Example of Sudan, 54 AFR. STUD. REV. 165 (2011); 
Jennifer Leaning, Diagnosing Genocide—The Case of Darfur, 351 N. ENGL. J. MED. 735 
(2004). 
13 See, e.g., Kang, supra note 5; Howard-Hassmann, supra note 5. 
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Somalia, and the current threat of famine in parts of war-torn Syria 
stand out as reminders that famine has not yet been banished to the 
annals of history. 
Despite such arguments, actual ICL accountability predicated on 
the creation, enforcement or perpetuation of famine conditions has 
remained elusive.  While the subjects of famine and starvation have 
been intermittently raised in discussions of ICL accountability, they 
have nonetheless remained at the periphery of ICL practice.  Outside 
the context of prison conditions, famine and starvation have tended 
to be addressed within ICL practice mostly indirectly, as root causes 
or collateral consequences of more familiar atrocity crimes.14 
This article considers why the relationship between famine and 
ICL has been so confused thus far, and suggests how famine might 
be more usefully conceptualized as a subject of ICL to help dispel 
some of this confusion.  In doing so this article puts forth two main 
arguments.  First, while the prosecution of international crimes 
stemming from famine events would present certain practical chal-
lenges, such challenges are not in any way unique, but are typical of 
the difficulties inherent in prosecuting atrocity crimes generally.  Se-
cond, language suggesting that the conditions of famine or starva-
tion are, in and of themselves, international crimes is misleading and 
conceptually inaccurate.  It would be more useful and accurate to 
conceptualize and present famine as a modality or means through 
which powerful group actors may bring about mass harm.  Ac-
knowledging that famine scenarios do not present any unique chal-
lenges to the pursuit of ICL accountability and conceptualizing fam-
ine conditions as a modality through which traditional international 
crimes may be committed, would help to dispel some of the persis-
tent misunderstandings concerning both famine and ICL more gen-
erally. 
To make out these arguments, this article proceeds in three sec-
tions.  First, an overview of existing scholarship and practice related 
to the intersections between famine and ICL is provided.  This sec-
tion demonstrates that famine-based ICL scholarship often utilizes 
confusing language that misleadingly suggests that famines are, in 
                                                      
14 In this vein, Diana Sankey has observed that “since mass starvation has tra-
ditionally been associated with natural disasters, perpetrators have been able to 
portray deaths and suffering as simply resulting from natural disasters or from the 
unforeseen consequences of other forms of violence.”  Diana Sankey, Towards Recog-
nition of Subsistence Harms: Reassessing Approaches to Socioeconomic Forms of Violence 
in Transitional Justice, 8 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 121, 129 (2014). 
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and of themselves, criminal events.  Meanwhile in practice, the sub-
ject of famine tends to be pushed to the margins of ICL accountabil-
ity efforts and/or treated as a contributing cause or collateral conse-
quence of more familiar forms of atrocity crimes.  Second, the 
question of potential areas of overlap between famine situations and 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity is revisited.  
This section demonstrates that each of these three main categories of 
international crimes may be implicated by famine and can provide 
significant coverage over key famine harms and attendant culpabil-
ities, depending on the relevant circumstances.  Third, the implica-
tions of this disconnect between potential and actual ICL coverage 
of famines is considered.  In particular, perceived roadblocks to ICL 
famine accountability, such as overdetermined causation, group 
culpability, concerns of criminalizing poor policy choices or mere 
negligent governance, and omission versus commission concerns 
are addressed.  Each of these perceived roadblocks are dismissed as 
being either general challenges presented by virtually all atrocity sit-
uations (e.g. causal overdetermination and complex group commis-
sion) or grounded in misunderstandings of the dynamics of modern 
famine (e.g. that famines are products of omissions, rather than pos-
itive acts).  This article then concludes by considering some of the 
questions raised by the foregoing analysis for the international crim-
inal justice system more broadly. 
 
2.  FAMINE AND ICL:  THE STORY SO FAR 
 
The standard narrative regarding the relationship between fam-
ine and ICL is one of near-complete neglect.15  While in a general 
sense it is true that there has yet to be an ICL prosecution predicated 
specifically and exclusively on famine there has been some limited 
engagement with famine issues in ICL jurisprudence.  For example, 
                                                      
15 For example, David Marcus states in a 2003 article that “the international 
community has never called for international criminal trials for government offi-
cials responsible for creating, inflicting, or prolonging famine.”  Marcus, supra note 
5, at 246. 
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the prosecutions of Adolf Eichmann in Israel16 and Hans Frank17 at 
the International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg both re-
sulted in convictions for various international crimes based at least 
partially on enforcing starvation conditions on civilians.  In convict-
ing Frank, who held the positions of Chief Civil Administration Of-
ficer and later, Governor General, of occupied Poland during World 
War II, the IMT found that “[t]he evidence establishes that this oc-
cupation policy was based on the complete destruction of Poland as 
a national entity, and a ruthless exploitation of its human and eco-
nomic resources for the German war effort.  All opposition was 
crushed with the utmost harshness.”18  Recent research by Evelyne 
Schmid demonstrates the significant degree to which the imposition 
of starvation conditions was integral to this ruthless occupation pol-
icy.19  In Frank’s private journal, translated by Schmid, he wrote that 
if the Nazis sentenced 1.2 million Jews to “die of hunger” that such 
deaths would likely be “noted only marginally” by the international 
community.20 
Although Frank’s conviction at the IMT demonstrates that he 
was not fully accurate in his assessment of the way in which the 
famine conditions in Jewish ghettos (and for that matter, in occupied 
Poland) would be treated by the international community, he did 
accurately identify a broader tendency to mischaracterize famines 
as non-criminal events.  The international community has histori-
cally viewed famine and other socio-economic forms of mass harm 
causation as resulting in unforeseeable harms or involving individ-
ual agency-devoid, wholly structural causes.  As a result, despite a 
growing body of research demonstrating that famines and other so-
cio-economic catastrophes can be products of rather direct human 
causation, there exists a persistent reluctance to conceptualize such 
                                                      
16 CrimC (Jer) 40/61 Attorney General v. Adolf Eichmann, ¶¶ 195–99 (1961) 
(Isr.) [hereinafter Eichmann Judgement], available at http://www.asser.nl/up-
load/documents/DomCLIC/Docs/NLP/Israel/Eichmann_Judgement_11-12-
1961.pdf [https://perma.cc/78WF-EVCH]. 
17 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL, 296–98 (1946) [hereinafter IMT Judgement], available at 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-I.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P8TQ-5LW7] (convicting accused Hans Frank of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity predicated on the treatment of civilians in occupied 
Poland). 
18 Id. at 296–97. 
19 EVELYNE SCHMID, TAKING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1–2 (2015). 
20 Quoted in id. at 2. 
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events as atrocities worthy of an ICL response.  Quite often scholars, 
lawyers and judges tend to dismiss famine and other forms of socio-
economic harm causation as being inherently excluded from the 
purview of ICL as this body of law is currently constituted.21  A 
growing cohort of scholars however, has identified opportunities 
within ICL, de lege lata, to address certain real-world socio-economic 
harms,22 including famine.23 
Despite the important contributions of much of this scholarship, 
in certain ways it has added to, rather than reduced the general state 
of confusion surrounding the question of intersections between ICL 
and famine.  Scholars analyzing famine as a potential subject of ICL 
often employ terminology that suggests that the conditions of fam-
ine or starvation themselves are, or at least should be, directly la-
beled international crimes.  This language of “famine crimes”24 sug-
gests that famine/starvation are either already criminalized 
                                                      
21 The assumption that violence, in a narrow sense of the word, is the primary 
subject matter of ICL pervades ICL scholarship.  One example of such an assump-
tion is an article written by current ICC Trial Chamber Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji con-
cerning potential ICL accountability for gross corruption, which he refers to as 
“kleptocracy.”  In the article, Judge Eboe-Osuji advocates for an ICL-based ap-
proach to combatting kleptocracy.  In doing so, however, he argues that kleptocratic 
rulers tend to commit violent human rights abuses to maintain their power and that 
kleptocratic acts amount to direct human rights violations.  Nonetheless, Judge 
Eboe-Osuji presents his argument primarily as one advocating the extension of ICL, 
rather than broader application of existing ICL, stating that although “the interna-
tional community appears now to have found the courage to visit with criminal 
sanctions individuals who grossly violate the fundamental rights of others . . .  this 
resolve appears thus far to focus exclusively on gross violations of human rights–
the violent type.”  Chile Eboe-Osuji, Kleptocracy: A Desired Subject of International 
Criminal Law that is in Dire Need of Prosecution by Universal Jurisdiction, in AFRICAN 
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 121, 129 (Evelyn A. Ankumah & 
Edward K. Kwakwa eds., 2005). 
22 See generally, e.g., Sonja Starr, Extraordinary Crimes at Ordinary Times: Interna-
tional Justice Beyond Crisis Situations, 101 NORTHWEST. UNIV. L. REV. 1257 (2007) (ar-
guing that international criminal tribunals should expand their scope outside of 
conflicts and crises to long-term systemic abuses committed during peacetime); 
SCHMID, supra note 19 (applying international criminal law to violations of eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights). 
23 See generally, e.g., Marcus, supra note 5 (advocating for the criminalization of 
the knowing or intentional use of policies that cause famine to decimate targeted 
populations). 
24 This language is regularly employed by both scholars advocating for the cre-
ation of famine/starvation-specific international crimes and those advocating for 
the application of existing ICL provisions to famine/starvation.  See, e.g., id.; Edkins, 
supra note 5; Bashi, supra note 5; DE WAAL, supra note 5.  Each of these authors, to 
varying degrees, focuses on current opportunities to address famine/starvation via 
ICL. 
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directly, or need to be for accountability to be successfully pursued.  
Such language has the potential to confuse key issues and to mis-
characterize the relationship between ICL and famine as one that is 
inherently discordant. 
The question of ICL accountability for famine was most directly 
and fulsomely addressed by David Marcus in a widely cited 2003 
article in which he argues that certain forms of what he terms “fam-
inogenic” behavior could be prosecuted as crimes against human-
ity.25  Marcus argues more specifically that “existing international 
law criminalizes first- and second-degree faminogenic behavior.”26  
First-degree faminogenic behavior occurs when “governments de-
liberately use hunger as a tool of extermination to annihilate trou-
blesome populations.”27  Second-degree behavior occurs when a 
government “recklessly” continues famine-causing policies “de-
spite learning that they are causing mass starvation.”28  Meanwhile, 
Marcus contends that ICL could not be deployed successfully as an 
accountability mechanism for third and fourth-degree faminogenic 
behavior.29  Third-degree refers to situations where authoritarian 
governments indifferently “turn blind eyes to mass hunger.”30  Fi-
nally, fourth-degree faminogenic behavior is described by Marcus 
in terms of negligence, involving “incompetent or hopelessly cor-
rupt government” who are unable to respond effectively to halt fam-
ine.31  Ultimately, Marcus is pessimistic regarding the likelihood that 
ICL’s “patch-work” coverage over famine scenarios will result in 
much actual ICL practice and calls for the codification of new, fam-
ine-specific international crimes.32 
Since the publication of Marcus’ influential article, numerous 
scholars and commentators have addressed the question of famine 
accountability under ICL.  Much like Marcus, Jenny Edkins argues 
that there is a need to replace the causally-neutral language of fam-
                                                      
25 Marcus, supra note 5. 
26 Id. at 246. 
27 Id. at 247. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 246–47. 
31 Id. at 246. 
32 Id. at 280. 
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ine, suggesting the phrase “mass starvation” to highlight the causal-
ity involved.33  Also a proponent of codification, Edkins further ar-
gues that explicit codification of famine-related international crimes 
could remove “immunity” from those who “commit famine crimes 
or the crime of mass starvation.”34  This tendency to refer to famine 
or starvation as “crimes” is also prevalent in other scholarship on 
the issue.35 
Other scholars, including the author, have considered potential 
ICL accountability for particular real-world famine scenarios.  This 
scholarship also presents a mixed bag of conclusions.  For example, 
in a 2011 article, the author suggested that a combination of the 
crimes against humanity of extermination, persecution and/or other 
inhumane acts, would present a useful framework for pursuing 
criminal accountability of former senior Khmer Rouge leaders for 
enforcing famine conditions on the civilian population while in 
power, concluding that convictions appear possible.36  This conclu-
sion can be contrasted with those of Solomon Bashi and Howard de 
Nike, who both concluded that accountability for the Khmer Rouge 
famine via ICL would likely be unattainable, raising issues of causa-
tion, the risk of retroactive criminalization, and mens rea defenses as 
potential roadblocks.37 
In a 2007 article, Grace Kang argued that North Korean dictator 
Kim Jong-Il and his subordinates could likely be held individually 
accountable for the crime against humanity of extermination predi-
cated on the enforcement of famine conditions throughout the coun-
try.38  In contrast, Rhoda Howard-Hassmann, writing after the 2011 
death of Kim Jong-Il, concluded that the famine causing behavior of 
the North Korean dictatorship qualified “merely” as the crime 
against humanity of other inhumane acts.39 
Meanwhile, other commentators have focused on the relation-
ship between severe violations of certain economic and social hu-
                                                      
33 Edkins, supra note 5, at 61. 
34 Id. 
35 For example, in discussing the Khmer Rouge era famine in Cambodia, Solo-
mon Bashi repeatedly characterizes “starvation” as a “crime.”  Bashi, supra note 5. 
36 DeFalco, supra note 5. 
37 Howard J. De Nike, Prosecuting Avoidable Famine as a Crime against Humanity 
(Dec. 20, 2011), Law and Global Justice Forum (on file with author); Bashi, supra 
note 5. 
38 Kang, supra note 5, at 85. 
39 Howard-Hassmann, supra note 5, at 158. 
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man rights, most notably the right to adequate food, and ICL.  Com-
mentators such as Evelyne Schmid, Diana Kearney and Larissa van 
den Herik have all, to varying degrees, argued that economic, social 
and cultural rights form a blind spot in the current international 
criminal justice regime and that such blindness is not necessitated 
by the strict boundaries of ICL, de lege lata.40  Other scholars have 
touched on famine conditions as aspects of “genocide by attrition” 
or “slow-burning” genocidal processes, or as a part of a broader 
blindness to economic questions in the pursuit of transitional jus-
tice.41 
As this scholarly debate has continued, in recent years small 
steps have been taken towards addressing famine and starvation via 
ICL in actual practice.  Yet such steps have been hesitant at best, fo-
cusing mostly on starvation conditions in prisons42 or referring to 
famine more generally as it relates to well-established forms of 
atrocity crimes.  At the International Criminal Court (ICC), Omar Al 
Bashir, President of the Republic of the Sudan, and several of his 
associates have been charged with genocide and crimes against hu-
manity, predicated in part on their alleged roles in attacks on vil-
lages in the Darfur region that resulted in large numbers of deaths 
attributable to both direct violence and the related spread of starva-
tion and disease.43  The ICC Office of the Prosecutor has alleged that 
                                                      
40 SCHMID, supra note 19; Diana Kearney, Food Deprivations as Crimes against 
Humanity, 46 NYU J. INT’L L. & POL. 253 (2013); Larissa van den Herik, Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights-International Criminal Law’s Blind Spot?, in ECONOMIC, 
SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND 
CHALLENGES 343, 365–66 (Eibe H. Riedel, Gilles Giacca, & Christophe Golay eds., 
2014). 
41 See, e.g., Fein, supra note 6 (mentioning starvation as one weapon used in 
several cases of genocide by attrition); Rosenberg & Silina, supra note 6 (discussing 
genocide by attrition); Maung Zarni & Alice Cowley, The Slow-Burning Genocide of 
Myanmar’s Rohingya, 23 PAC. RIM POL’Y J. 683 (2014) (studying the long-term human 
rights abuses in Myanmar); Zinaida Miller, Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the “Eco-
nomic” in Transitional Justice, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 266 (2008) (discussing the 
omission of issues of economic justice and structural violence from the field of tran-
sitional justice); JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC VIOLENCE IN TRANSITION (Dustin N. Sharp, 
ed., 2014) (examining and arguing for a greater role for transitional justice in eco-
nomic violence). 
42 See Kearney, supra note 40, at 256 (summarizing ICL case law related to star-
vation conditions in prison settings). 
43 The general factual allegations are laid out in Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-
02/05-157-AnxA, Public Redacted Version of the Prosecutor’s Application under 
Article 58 (July 14, 2008) [hereinafter Al Bashir, Article 58 Application].  ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber I amended the charges following this application.  Prosecutor v. Al 
Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al 
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the creation of famine formed part of a criminal plan to take control 
over certain areas in Darfur through the commission of genocidal 
acts and various crimes against humanity.44  Thus far, however, Al 
Bashir and his key associates have successfully evaded arrest and 
referral to the ICC. 
North Korea has been another famine site that has engendered 
significant interest in a potential ICL response.  Former North Ko-
rean dictator Kim Jong-Il died however, without facing accountabil-
ity for enforcing disastrous famine conditions on the civilian popu-
lation,45 and his son and successor Kim Jong-Un has similarly 
managed to evade legal accountability thus far.  The latter has con-
tinued to enjoy impunity despite the fact that a United Nations (UN) 
commission of inquiry concluded in 2014 that by “knowingly caus-
ing prolonged starvation” Kim Jong-Un and other high-level North 
Korean officials appear to have committed the crime against human-
ity of other inhumane acts against the North Korean civilian popu-
lation.46  Recently, Marzuki Darusman, UN Special Rapporteur on 
the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea, called for Kim Jong-Un to be officially warned that he 
could be held accountable for various international crimes based on 
treatment of civilians under his rule.47  Yet the prospect of actually 
prosecuting Kim Jong-Un or his underlings remains unlikely at the 
present time. 
Although it is tempting to attribute the lack of accountability for 
famine in Darfur and North Korea to more generalized enforcement 
                                                      
Bashir (July 12, 2010) [hereinafter Al Bashir, Second Arrest Warrant]; see also Edkins, 
supra note 5, at 62-63 (discussing the prosecution of starvation crimes in Darfur un-
der “more general provisions against violence against civilians”). 
44 Al Bashir, Article 58 Application, supra note 43. 
45 For an overview of Jong-Il’s potential ICL responsibility for enforcing such 
famine conditions, see Kang, supra note 5; Howard-Hassmann, supra note 5. 
46 Comm’n of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea, Rep. of the Comm’n of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/63, ¶¶ 49–55, 74–79, 82 (Feb. 7, 2014) [here-
inafter 2014 UN North Korea Report].  For a detailed overview of the factual find-
ings of the Commission, see Comm’n of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Demo-
cratic People’s Republic of Korea, Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Comm’n of Inquiry 
on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/25/CRP.1 (Feb. 7. 2014). 
47 Nick Cumming-Bruce, North Korea Leader Should Be Told He Could Face Trial, 
U.N. Official Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2016), http://www.ny-
times.com/2016/02/16/world/asia/north-korea-leader-should-be-told-he-could-
face-trial-un-official-says.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/68AE-FZ3T]. 
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problems and jurisdictional gaps that plague the current interna-
tional criminal justice regime, famine accountability has also been 
lacking even when general personal and subject matter jurisdiction 
is obtained.  Famine and starvation were major components of the 
atrocities committed in both East Timor and Cambodia.  The East 
Timorese Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Commission esti-
mated that “84,200 people died from displacement-related hunger 
and illness” during the repressive Indonesian occupation of 1975-
1999.48  Demographers commissioned by judges at the Extraordi-
nary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)  estimated that 
approximately fifty percent, or between 800,000 and 1.2 million 
Cambodians died from causes other than direct interpersonal vio-
lence during the reign of the Khmer Rouge from 1975-1979.49  Yet at 
both the East Timorese Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC) and 
the ECCC, famine issues have taken a backseat to more traditional 
atrocity crimes. 
Although the East Timor Commission for Reception, Truth and 
Reconciliation dedicated an entire chapter of its final report to forced 
displacement and famine,50 the mandate of the SPSC was limited to 
directly addressing acts of terrorism and direct violence committed 
solely between January 1 and October 25 of 1999.51 
Meanwhile, the degree to which issues related to the Khmer 
Rouge era famine in Cambodia will be addressed by the ECCC re-
mains unclear.  To date, the ECCC has disproportionately focused 
on familiar, physically violent crimes.  The Court’s first judgement 
was limited to crimes related to the operation of a specific prison, 
                                                      
48 Comm’n for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation Timor-Leste, Chega! The 
Rep. of the Comm’n for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation Timor-Leste, 72 (2005), avail-
able at http://www.etan.org/etanpdf/2006/CAVR/Chega!-Report-Executive-
Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQH4-MPEP] [hereinafter Chega!]. 
49 Ewa Tabeau & Kheam They, Khmer Rouge Victims in Cambodia, April 1975 - 
January 1979: A Critical Assessment of Major Estimates (Sept. 30, 2009), 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/courtdoc/D140_1_1_Public_Redacted_EN.PDF [https://perma.cc/6AHL-
7WWK]. 
50 Chega!, supra note 48, at 72-85.  For a helpful discussion of these findings, see 
Sankey, supra note 14, at 138-39. 
51  The Special Panels also suffered from serious fair trial shortcomings.  For 
an overview of the work of the Special Panels and an analysis of their shortcomings, 
see DAVID COHEN, INDIFFERENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY: THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN EAST TIMOR (2006), https://schol-
arspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/10125/3528/1/sr009.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MZ66-BS8A]. 
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torture and execution center.52  Meanwhile, the Court’s second case 
against Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, the two most senior former 
Khmer Rouge leaders still alive, has been bifurcated into a series of 
trials, with the first, now-completed trial (referred to as Case 002/01) 
focusing exclusively on allegations related to the events immedi-
ately following the Khmer Rouge’s seizure of power in 1975.53  While 
the second Case 002 trial (referred to as Case 002/02) is currently 
underway and this trial does touch on living and working condi-
tions, it does so only in relation to a handful of specific locations, 
rather than addressing such issues from a nationwide perspective.  
It remains to be seen whether and the degree to which the ECCC 
Trial Chamber will address famine, either locally or as a nationwide 
phenomenon. 
 
3.  REVISITING FAMINE ACCOUNTABILITY OPPORTUNITIES WITHIN ICL 
 
Given that famine has thus far occupied a rather awkward posi-
tion at the periphery of international criminal justice efforts, one 
might conclude that this is because ICL simply lacks the necessary 
legal provisions to address famine causation successfully.  The 
harms associated with famine–slow deterioration and the spread of 
disease–are not immediately familiar as products of criminal behav-
ior in a visceral sense.  That is, famines, though branded as interna-
tional disasters, crises or emergencies, do not involve the kinds of 
spectacular violence that are commonly associated with the commis-
sion of atrocity crimes.  Famines kill slowly and lack any physical 
linkages connecting those responsible for causing famine with those 
who ultimately suffer and die.  As a result, unlike more traditional 
atrocity crimes, such as violent massacres, bombings or sexual vio-
lence, famine situations present no singular, identifiable moment of 
self-evidently criminal action.  Such singular, manifestly criminal 
acts provide a useful fulcrum, around which an entire ICL trial can 
be centered.  Such dramatic moments of criminality rarely exist dur-
ing famines.  Instead, famines tend to be caused cumulatively and 
to worsen over time.  This begs the question of feasibility.  Can fam-
ine events actually engender ICL responsibility?  Various scholars 
                                                      
52 Prosecutor v. Duch, Case No. 01/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgement (Ex-
traordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia July 26, 2010). 
53 Prosecutor v. Chea, Case No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, Case 002/01 
Judgement (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Aug. 7, 2014). 
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have answered this question affirmatively, though subject to im-
portant qualifiers and often disagreeing as to what crimes might be 
involved.54  The following section revisits this question of feasibility 
by providing an analysis of promising entry points for famine ac-
countability within genocide, war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity.  This analysis demonstrates that, depending on the circum-
stances, famine may form a means or modality through which 
genocide, war crimes and/or crimes against humanity may be com-
mitted. 
 
3.1.  Genocide 
 
The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (“Genocide Convention”) defines genocide as 
one or more of an enumerated list of “acts committed with the intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group.”55  In Prosecutor v. Musema, the Appeals Chamber of the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) held that the crime 
of genocide consists of three elements:  (1) commission of one of the 
enumerated acts; (2) against a recognized protected class, “specifi-
cally targeted as such”; and (3) committed with the intent to destroy 
the protected group in whole or in part (dolus specialis).56  Enumer-
ated genocidal acts include, inter alia, killing members of the group; 
causing “serious bodily or mental harm” to members of the group; 
and “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated 
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”57  Recent 
jurisprudence has held that the portion of a protected group tar-
geted for destruction must form a “substantial portion” of the over-
all group population.58  This requirement may be numerically or 
                                                      
54 See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 5; Edkins, supra note 5; Kang, supra note 5; How-
ard-Hassmann, supra note 5. 
55 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
concluded Dec. 9 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, art. 2 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [here-
inafter Genocide Convention]. 
56 Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 
154 (Jan. 27, 2000). 
57 Genocide Convention, supra note 55, at art 2. 
58 Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgement, ¶ 8 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004); Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, 
Judgement, ¶ 82 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 1999).  
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qualitatively satisfied;59 however, “the part targeted must be signif-
icant enough to have an impact on the group as a whole.”60 
In Prosecutor v. Akayesu, the ICTR Trial Chamber held that “kill-
ing members of the [protected] group” must be interpreted as “mur-
der,” according to the definition in the Rwandan penal code to pred-
icate liability for genocide.61  Thus, for an instance of famine to 
amount to genocide under article 2(a) of the Genocide Convention, 
those responsible for the famine must have intentionally sought to 
kill members of a protected group.  This interpretation means that 
for this particular actus reus requirement to be satisfied within a fam-
ine scenario, the perpetrators must have acted with the specific in-
tent to kill members of a protected group, while also having the spe-
cial intent for these killings to form part of an effort to destroy the 
group in whole or in part.  The Chamber further held that “[c]ausing 
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group does not 
necessarily mean that the harm [required] is permanent and irreme-
diable” for genocide liability to attach.62  The Trial Chamber of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
further elaborated on this point in Prosecutor v. Krstić, stating: 
serious harm need not cause permanent and irremediable 
harm, but it must involve harm that goes beyond temporary 
unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation.  It must be 
harm that results in a grave and long-term disadvantage to a 
person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive life.63 
Presumably, enforcement of famine conditions on a protected 
group would rise to the requisite level of “serious bodily or mental 
harm,” as the suffering associated with famine often causes the type 
                                                      
59 Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement, ¶ 634 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001) (holding that genocide requires “an intent 
to destroy only part of the group must nevertheless concern a substantial part 
thereof, either numerically or qualitatively”). 
60 Krstić, Appeal Judgement, supra note 58, at ¶ 8. 
61 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, ¶ 500 (Sept. 2, 
1998) (holding that under the Rwandan Penal Code murder “is homicide commit-
ted with the intent to cause death”). 
62 Id. at ¶ 502. 
63 Krstić, Trial Judgement, supra note 59, at ¶ 513.  Krstić was convicted of gen-
ocide by the Trial Chamber.  Id. at ¶ 688.  On Appeal, this conviction was down-
graded to “aiding and abetting” genocide.  Krstić, Appeal Judgement, supra note 
58, at ¶ 138.  Nonetheless, the Appeals Chamber did not find any error in the Trial 
Chamber’s finding that genocide occurred in Srebrenica during the relevant time.  
Id. at ¶¶ 2-32. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
  
1132 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:4 
of “grave and long-term disadvantage” to the ability of victims to 
live a normal and constructive life required according to current ICL 
jurisprudence.64 
 
3.1.1.  Inflicting Genocidal “Conditions of Life” 
 
Starvation may also be implicated under article 2(c) of the Gen-
ocide Convention as a method of “inflicting on the group conditions 
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or 
in part.”65  The Preparatory Commission for the International Crim-
inal Court subdivided the requirements of article 2(c) into five dis-
tinct elements: 
(1) The perpetrator inflicted certain conditions of life upon 
one or more persons. 
(2) Such person or persons belonged to a particular national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group. 
(3) The perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or in part, 
the national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. 
(4) The conditions of life were calculated to bring about the 
physical destruction of that group, in whole or in part. 
(5) The conduct took place in the context of a manifest pat-
tern of similar conduct directed against that group or was 
conduct that could itself effect such destruction.66 
                                                      
64 Krstić, Trial Judgement, supra note 59, at ¶ 513.  Famine survivors face seri-
ous long term physical and mental health challenges.  For an overview of the “hor-
rors” of famine and the demographic implications of famine, see generally Ó 
GRÁDA, supra note 2, at 45–68, 90–128.  There is extensive literature examining the 
long-term health ramifications of famine on both survivors and children born to 
undernourished mothers.  While this scholarship continues to evolve, the fact that 
famines result in long-term negative health outcomes for survivors, with likely in-
tergenerational consequences as well, is relatively settled.  For an example of such 
scholarship, see, e.g., Tessa Roseboom, Susanne de Rooij & Rebecca Painter, The 
Dutch Famine and its Long-Term Consequences for Adult Health, 82 EARLY HUM. DEV. 
485 (2006). 
65 Krstić, Trial Judgement, supra note 59, at ¶ 540. 
66 Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Report of the 
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Addendum Part II, Final-
ized draft text of the Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 
2000), at 7, art 6(c). 
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According to the Preparatory Commission, intentionally induc-
ing starvation amongst a protected class of individuals appears to 
qualify as genocidal infliction of “conditions of life” that destroy a 
targeted group in whole or in part.67 
The ICTR has followed a similar tract in discussing what acts 
may satisfy article 2(c) of the Genocide Convention.  In Akayesu, the 
ICTR Trial Chamber held that article 2(c) includes “methods of de-
struction by which the perpetrator does not immediately kill the 
members of the group, but which, ultimately, seek their physical de-
struction.”68  In Prosecutor v. Kayishema, the Trial Chamber similarly 
stated that the Genocide Convention “allows for the punishment of 
the perpetrator for the infliction of substandard conditions of life 
which, if left to run their course, could bring about the physical de-
struction of the group . . . [including, inter alia,] the starving of a 
group of people.”69 
 
3.1.2.  Genocidal Dolus Specialis 
 
While subsections (b) and (c) of article 2 of the Genocide Con-
vention establish that the actus reus of genocide could encompass the 
targeted creation of famine conditions affecting a particular na-
tional, ethnic, racial or religious group, the success or failure of any 
genocide prosecution predicated on famine would likely hinge on 
whether the crime’s stringent mens rea could be established.  A per-
petrator of genocide must commit one of the acts enumerated under 
article 2 of the Genocide Convention while possessing the specific 
intent to destroy a protected group in whole or in part.70  This special 
mens rea of dolus specialis requires that the victims be targeted specif-
ically because of their status as a member of a protected class, as “the 
victim of the crime of genocide is not only the individual, but also 
                                                      
67 Id. at 7 n. 4 (The Preparatory Commission includes “deprivation of resources 
indispensable for survival, such as food or medical services” as an example of a 
genocidal infliction of conditions of life calculated to cause physical destruction of 
part or all of a group.). 
68 Akayesu, Trial Judgement, supra note 61, at ¶ 505. 
69 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement, ¶ 116 (May 21, 
1999). 
70 See, e.g., Krstić, Trial Judgement, supra note 59, at ¶ 542 (stating that “the 
mens rea of [genocide] is described as the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such”). 
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the group to which he or she belongs.”71  Thus, for genocide to apply 
to a famine scenario, there must be evidence demonstrating that not 
only were those individuals responsible for causing the famine 
aware of the suffering and death that resulted from their actions, but 
also that such individuals specifically caused the famine with the 
goal of destroying at least a substantial portion of a group of people 
protected by the Genocide Convention. 
 
3.1.3.  Intersections between Famine and Genocide 
 
Even though in most famine scenarios, it would be quite difficult 
to prove that any accused was aware that they were causing famine, 
let alone that such accused acted with the mens rea of dolus specialis, 
there does exist some support for the treatment of the imposition of 
famine conditions as a key aspect of a larger genocidal project.  In a 
letter written sometime around 1953 but only recently published, 
genocide pioneer Rafael Lemkin discussed the “Soviet Genocide in 
Ukraine.”72  Lemkin argued that the Soviet government used the 
“weapon” of starvation against Ukrainian farmers, resulting in 
5,000,000 famine deaths between 1932 and 1933.73  According to 
Lemkin’s view, the Ukrainian peasantry was “sacrificed” by the So-
viet Kremlin by enforcing famine conditions through forced collec-
tivization and state grain expropriation.74  According to Lemkin, en-
forcement of these conditions was one aspect of a four-pronged 
genocidal plan aimed at the “systematic destruction of the Ukrain-
ian nation, in its progressive absorption within the new Soviet na-
tion.”75  Other commentators have also argued that this famine was 
a product of genocide, as well as other international crimes.76 
                                                      
71 Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgement, ¶ 61 (June 
7, 2001) (citing Akayesu, Trial Judgement, supra note 61, at ¶¶ 521-22); accord 
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 137 (2d ed., 2008). 
72 Text of original letter reprinted in Roman Serbyn, Lemkin on Genocide of Na-
tions, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 123, 125–30 (2009). 
73 Id. at 128. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 129. 
76 See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 5; Aloyo, supra note 8, at 500.  Both authors gen-
erally refer to the Ukrainian Holodomor famine as an example of a historical example 
of a situation involving a proposed understanding of international criminality. 
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The 1961 prosecution of Adolf Eichmann in Israel provides fur-
ther support for this formulation of genocide via starvation,77 albeit 
in the form of a single, highly contentious domestic trial.78  The Dis-
trict Court of Jerusalem convicted Eichmann of multiple counts of 
“crimes against the Jewish People,” a domestic formulation of gen-
ocide, predicated on his role in the Nazi Party’s “Final Solution” 
plan to exterminate all Jews in Europe, launched in the summer of 
1941.79 
The District Court held that victims of the second count of crimes 
against the Jewish People were Jews who were “put to hard labour, 
with the intention of killing them, too, in time, in some way; but who 
were saved because of the advance of the Soviet army.”80  Similarly, 
the third count of crimes against the Jewish people was predicated 
on “causing serious bodily or mental harm to Jews” after the sum-
mer of 1941 pursuant to the Final Solution: 
by means of enslavement, starvation, deportation and perse-
cution, confinement to ghettos, to transit camps and to con-
centration camps - all this under conditions intended to hu-
miliate the Jews, to deny their rights as human beings, to 
suppress and torment them by inhuman suffering and tor-
ture . . . with the [ultimate] intention of exterminating the 
Jewish People.81 
Thus, according to the Israeli District Court in Eichmann, holo-
caust survivors who had suffered at the hands of the Nazis, yet ulti-
mately survived, were also victims of “crimes against the Jewish 
people,” along with the millions who were killed as part of the Final 
Solution plan. 
Eichmann also provides an example of the critical importance of 
mens rea proofs in any genocide prosecution and how such proofs 
could interact with famine issues.  In Eichmann, the District Court 
held that the forced deportation of Jews prior to the implementation 
of the Final Solution plan did not amount to a crime against the Jew-
                                                      
77 For an excellent account of this trial, see HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN 
JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (Viking Press 1963). 
78 For a renowned critique of the legal processes through which Eichmann was 
prosecuted, see id. 
79 Eichmann Judgement, supra note 16, at ¶¶ 195-99.  
80 Id. at ¶ 196. 
81 Id. at ¶ 199 (emphasis added). 
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ish people, due to insufficient proof Eichmann possessed the neces-
sary mens rea at the time.82  This finding was despite the fact that the 
Court also found that the deportations were “organized by the Ac-
cused in complete disregard for the health and lives of the deported 
Jews” and also that “many Jews died as a result of the expulsions.”83  
Although Eichmann himself was found to have both “foresaw” and 
“wished” the “murderous consequences of these deportations,” the 
Court found insufficient evidence to conclude that Eichmann pos-
sessed the “intentional aim to exterminate” and therefore, “deal[t] 
with these inhuman acts as being crimes against humanity” rather 
than crimes against the Jewish People.84 
Meanwhile, although both the ICTR and ICTY have dealt exten-
sively with genocide allegations, both tribunals have focused mainly 
on the perpetration of direct violence as methods of committing gen-
ocide.  The Rwandan genocide was short and brutally violent, with-
out time for killing by starvation to become a serious possibility.  
Meanwhile, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, genocide charges 
were focused on mass executions of Muslim men and boys at Sre-
brenica.  As such, these courts, while generally acknowledging that 
genocide could be committed by means other than mass executions 
and targeted physical violence, have dealt with issues of famine and 
starvation exclusively under the rubrics of war crimes and/or 
crimes against humanity. 
At the ICC, meanwhile, it appears the issues of potential inter-
sections between famine conditions and genocide may eventually be 
borne out within the context of cases arising out of the Darfur region 
of Sudan.  Most notably, following a successful appeal by the pros-
ecution, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I added genocide charges to the ar-
rest warrant against Omar Al Bashir.85  The prosecution had alleged 
that genocidal acts were committed against members of the Fur, Ma-
salit and Zaghawa ethnic groups in the Darfur region, including 
“causing serious bodily or mental harm and . . . deliberately inflict-
ing conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction” 
of the ethnic groups as part of the Sudanese government’s anti-in-
surgency campaign.86  Indeed, specific reference is made in the se-
                                                      
82 Id. at ¶ 186. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Al Bashir, Second Arrest Warrant, supra note 43. 
86 Id. at 7. 
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cond arrest warrant to acts of poisoning potable water sources, for-
cible transfer and encouraging members of other ethnic groups to 
settle the land of forcibly evicted victims.87  The ICC Office of the 
Prosecutor, in its original application to the Pre-Trial Chamber con-
cerning the situation in Darfur, referenced various starvation-caus-
ing acts in Darfur as aspects of an alleged genocidal criminal enter-
prise led by Al Bashir and his inner circle.88  In particular, the OTP 
alleged that in the Darfur region approximately “83,000 [victims] 
died as a consequence of injury, starvation, lack of water, or condi-
tions in [refugee] camps” between September 2003 and January 
2005.89  In 2012 ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda has also stated that 
further charges may be pursued in relation to the situation in Darfur, 
including those predicated on “the blocking of distribution of hu-
manitarian aid.”90  Whether Al Bashir or his alleged criminal com-
patriots will ever be successfully arrested and brought to the Hague 
for trial however, remains uncertain, as the ICC’s investigation in 
Darfur has been suspended since December 2014.91 
Despite this limited jurisprudence and the fact that the Darfur 
cases at the ICC remain in their preliminary stages, there is ample 
support already for the general proposition that enforcing famine 
conditions on a national, racial, ethnic or religious group, with the 
intent to destroy the group in whole or in part, could qualify as an 
act of genocide.  The Eichmann Judgement provides some precedent, 
if only in the form of a single domestic conviction, while such an 
approach is also indirectly supported in ICTR and ICTY jurispru-
dence concerning the potential methods of establishing genocidal 
actus reus.92  Finally, if and when Darfur situation cases make their 
                                                      
87 Id. 
88 Al Bashir, Article 58 Application, supra note 43, at ¶¶ 30, 111, 172-73, 177, 
202, 388 (repeatedly referencing the causation of death by starvation as a main as-
pect of the alleged genocide in Darfur). 
89 Id. at ¶ 111 (emphasis added). 
90 Peter James Spielmann, ICC Prosecutor: Sudan may face more Darfur 
charges, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.sandiegouniontrib-
une.com/sdut-icc-prosecutor-sudan-may-face-more-darfur-charges-2012dec13-
story.html [https://perma.cc/X7P6-U23P]. 
91 See David Smith, ICC Chief Prosecutor Shelves Darfur War Crimes Probe, THE 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2014), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2014/dec/14/icc-darfur-war-crimes-fatou-bensouda-sudan 
[https://perma.cc/4GGN-29SL]. 
92 See, e.g., Akayesu, Trial Judgement, supra note 61 at ¶ 506 (referencing Eich-
mann and holding that “the means of deliberate inflicting on the group conditions 
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way to trial at the ICC, it is likely that further jurisprudence will be 
developed discussing the circumstances under which enforcing 
famine conditions can be legally labelled as a method through which 
genocide may be committed. 
 
3.2.  War Crimes 
 
The term “war crimes” refers to serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law entailing individual criminal responsibil-
ity.93  War crimes were charged extensively in post-World War II 
prosecutions94 and are predicated on humanitarian law require-
ments dating back to the Hague Conventions of 189995 and 190796 
and expanded upon in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,97 and 
                                                      
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction, in whole or part [for pur-
poses of the Genocide Convention], include, inter alia, subjecting a group of people 
to a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from homes and the reduction of essen-
tial medical services below minimum requirement”). 
93 See CASSESE, supra note 71, at 81. 
94 See, e.g., Charter of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, art. 6(b), 
Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter IMT Charter]. 
95 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and 
its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 
1899, 32 Stat. 1803, available at https://ihl-data-
bases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/150?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/53LZ-TNA9] 
[hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention]. 
96 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its 
annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ap-
plic/ihl/ihl.nsf/0/1d1726425f6955aec125641e0038bfd6 [https://perma.cc/6G6V-
RGND] [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention]. 
97 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, avail-
able at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCI-commentary 
[https://perma.cc/2CT6-T7SF] [hereinafter Geneva I]; Geneva Convention (II) for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, available at https://ihl-data-
bases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttach-
ment/ap-
plic/ihl/ihl.nsf/2F5AA9B07AB61934C12563CD002D6B25/FULLTEXT/GC-II-
EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CKV-EDGG] [hereinafter Geneva II]; Geneva Conven-
tion (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 
135, available at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/375?OpenDocument 
[https://perma.cc/U3FG-JR4Q] [hereinafter Geneva III]; Geneva Convention (IV) 
Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Times of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss4/2
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their two additional protocols of 1977.98  The current body of war 
crimes is largely drawn from actions constituting so-called “grave 
breaches” of the Geneva Conventions, although other flagrant vio-
lations of customary humanitarian law can also rise to the level of 
war crimes. 
 
3.2.1.  The Armed Conflict “Nexus” Requirement 
 
Once it is established that an armed conflict existed at the rele-
vant time, the prosecution must demonstrate in each case that every 
charged war crime shared some link or “nexus” with the predicate 
armed conflict at issue.99  The ICTY Trial Chamber has stated that 
what is required is an “obvious link” between an alleged criminal 
act and the predicate armed conflict in order for it to qualify as a war 
crime.100  This requirement, however, does not mean that war crimes 
can only be committed within areas where armed hostilities physi-
cally take place, as it is sufficient that alleged war crimes be “closely 
related to the hostilities occurring in other parts of the territories 
controlled by the parties to the conflict.”101 
 
 
                                                      
287 available at https://ihl-data-
bases.icrc.org/ihl/385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/6756482d86146898c12564
1e004aa3c5 [https://perma.cc/FT95-Q5BS] [hereinafter Geneva IV]. 
98 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and re-
lating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, adopted June 
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1979) [hereinafter “Protocol I”]; 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol II]. 
99 See CASSESE, supra note 71, at 82–86. 
100 E.g. Prosecutor v. Delalić (Čelebići Camp), Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, 
¶ 193 (Int’l  Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998) (“It is axiomatic 
that not every serious crime committed during the armed conflict in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina can be regarded as a violation of international humanitarian law. 
There must be an obvious link between the criminal act and the armed conflict.”). 
101 Prosecutor v. Blaškić (“Lašva Valley”), Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, ¶ 
69 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000); accord Prosecutor v. 
Kordić, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgement, ¶ 32 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001). 
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3.2.2.  International versus Non-International Armed Conflicts 
 
Until relatively recently, the predicate armed conflict for war 
crimes applicability was strictly required to be international in char-
acter, thereby excluding the types of civil wars and insurgencies that 
now form the vast majority of armed conflicts.102  This antiquated 
focus on classical warfare between two distinct nation-states has sig-
nificant repercussions for the potential coverage of war crimes over 
modern famine scenarios, as famine is often the by-product of local-
ized, sectarian armed conflict or armed insurgencies.  In 1995, the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tribunal’s first case, Prosecutor v. 
Tadić, signaled a move towards relaxing this strict requirement by 
holding that serious violations of fundamental provisions of inter-
national humanitarian law may be regarded as true war crimes re-
gardless of whether the underlying conflict is international in char-
acter.103  The Chamber held that for a violation of humanitarian law 
to rise to the level of war crime, three conditions must be met:  (1) 
the acts by the accused amount to a “serious infringement” of a hu-
manitarian law provision protecting important values, the breach of 
which necessarily involves grave consequences for the victim; (2) 
the rule being violated must be part of customary international law 
or provided for in an applicable treaty; and (3) applicable law must 
provide for individual criminal responsibility for violations of the 
rule in question.104  Although Tadić marked an emerging ICL trend 
towards relaxation of the strict requirement of an international 
armed conflict, the scope and applicability of war crimes remains 
narrower during non-international armed conflicts.105 
                                                      
102 See, e.g., CASSESE, supra note 71, at 81 (“Traditionally, war crimes were held 
to embrace only violations of international rules regulating war proper; that is in-
ternational armed conflicts and not civil wars.”). 
103 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defence Motion 
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 96-137 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (providing an overview of the evolution of customary in-
ternational law in relation to internal armed conflicts and concluding that “custom-
ary international law imposes criminal liability for serious violations of common 
Article 3, as supplemented by other general principles and rules on the protection 
of victims of internal armed conflict, and for breaching certain fundamental princi-
ples and rules regarding means and methods of combat in civil strife” at ¶ 134). 
104 Id. at ¶ 94. 
105 See, e.g., Knut Dörmann, “War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court, with a Special Focus on the Negotiations on the Elements 
of Crimes” 7 Max Planck U.N.Y.B. 341, 344-48 (2003) (“[A]pproximately half of the 
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Generally, an armed conflict exists “whenever there is a resort to 
armed forces between States or protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between 
such groups within a State.”106  For the conflict to be deemed inter-
national in character, it must either involve the breakout of hostili-
ties between two States107 or, as held by the ICTY Trial Chamber in 
Prosecutor v. Kordić, an internal conflict may become international if:  
“(i) another State intervenes in that conflict through its troops, or 
alternatively if (ii) some of the participants in the internal conflict act 
on behalf of that State.”108  In situations where it is unclear whether 
certain belligerent forces are affiliated with a foreign State or not, the 
ICTY has utilized a test of “overall control” to determine the rele-
vant chain of command.109 
 
3.2.3.  Victim Identity and Protected Classes 
 
The identity of victims of putative war crimes also affects what 
crimes may be implicated in any given scenario.  For crimes that 
originated as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, the victims 
must fall into one of the classes of individuals protected by the Con-
ventions themselves, including:  civilians under an occupying 
power, health workers and aid workers, and soldiers rendered hors 
de combat, such as wounded or shipwrecked soldiers, and prisoners 
of war.110  Importantly, under the Geneva Conventions, civilians are 
not protected from abuses committed by their own government, as 
                                                      
provisions of article 8 applicable to international armed conflicts were not included 
in the sections on non-international armed conflicts.”). 
106 Tadić, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 103, at ¶ 70; accord Pros-
ecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-A & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgement, ¶ 56 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002). 
107 E.g. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶ 84 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (“It is indisputable that an armed 
conflict is international if it takes place between two or more States.”). 
108 Id.; accord Kordić, Trial Judgement, supra note 101, at ¶ 66. 
109 E.g., Tadić, Appeal Judgement, supra note 107, at ¶ 120 (“Normally a mem-
ber of the group does not act on his own but conforms to the standards prevailing 
in the group and is subject to the authority of the head of the group. Consequently, 
for the attribution to a State of acts of these groups it is sufficient to require that the 
group as a whole be under the overall control of the State.”). 
110 See Geneva I, supra note 97; Geneva II supra note 97; Geneva III supra note 
97; Geneva IV, supra note 97. 
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according to the fourth Geneva Convention relating to the protec-
tion of civilians, protected persons include civilians “who, at a given 
moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of 
a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or 
Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.”111  This limita-
tion does not apply, however, to a limited set of war crimes consist-
ing of violations of Common Article 3 shared by all four Geneva 
Conventions and applicable to all armed conflicts, including those 
non-international in character.  For Common Article 3 to apply, the 
victims must simply be non-combatants.112  Finally war crimes that 
have developed within general customary international law outside 
of the Geneva Conventions have individual requirements concern-
ing victim status for some crimes, although typically reference is 
made to civilian victims more generally in the language of such 
crimes. 
 
3.2.4.  Intersections between War Crimes and Famine 
 
War crimes have evolved into a long list of offences drawn from 
a mix of customary and codified ICL.  While it is not a codification 
of custom, the ICC’s Rome Statute provides an illustrative set of 
modern war crimes in Article 8, including numerous crimes that 
could be implicated during periods of famine and starvation.  Which 
crime(s) might be relevant to any particular scenarios would depend 
largely on both whether the relevant famine took place during a pe-
riod of international versus domestic armed conflict and the identity 
of the victims.  For example, it is a war crime under Article 8(2)(a) of 
the Rome Statute to subject members of a class of persons protected 
by one of the four Geneva Conventions to “inhuman treatment,” to 
“[w]ilfully cause great suffering, or serious injury to body or health” 
of such individuals, or to extensively destroy or appropriate their 
property.113  Presumably, enforcing famine conditions on a pro-
                                                      
111 Geneva IV, supra note 97, at art. 4. 
112 See Geneva I, supra note 97; Geneva II, supra note 97; Geneva III, supra note 
97; Geneva IV, supra note 97, at art. 3 (uniformly prohibiting “violence to life and 
person, in particular murder of all kinds” against persons placed hors de combat). 
113 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, art. 
8(2)(a)(ii)-(iv), July 17, 1998 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Stat-
ute]. 
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tected civilian population could rise to the level of inhuman treat-
ment, great suffering and/or serious injury.  Moreover, wartime 
famines are often caused by military destruction of agricultural 
property or expropriation of foodstuffs and these actions could be 
prosecuted under the war crime of destroying or appropriating pro-
tected property. 
The Rome Statute also provides for jurisdiction over various war 
crimes during periods of international armed conflict, including “di-
recting attacks against civilian objects,” destroying or seizing enemy 
property, pillaging, committing “outrages upon personal dignity,” 
and most notably “[i]ntentionally using starvation of civilians as a 
method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to 
their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as pro-
vided for under the Geneva Conventions.”114 
Meanwhile, the list of war crimes potentially relevant to famine 
and starvation that can be committed during periods of non-inter-
national armed conflict are much more cursory, including violations 
of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and limited cus-
tomary law crimes.  Article 8(2)(c)(i)-(ii) of the Rome Statute contains 
the war crime of “violence to life and person” which encompasses 
“cruel treatment” and also the crime of “outrages upon person dig-
nity.”115  Meanwhile, Article 8(2)(e) subsections (v) and (xii) render 
pillage and destruction of property outside the “necessities of the 
conflict” war crimes during periods of non-international armed con-
flict.116 
When considered as a whole, certain principles relevant to fam-
ine scenarios can be drawn out from amongst these war crimes.  
First, famine conditions could indirectly be treated as forming key 
aspects of war crimes in specialized situations, as the harms associ-
ated with periods of famine clearly can rise to the level of inhuman, 
cruel or degrading treatment, or an outrage against personal dig-
nity, making the creation of famine conditions a potential actus reus 
mechanism for numerous war crimes.  Second, the criminalization 
of “intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of war-
fare” under Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Rome Statute stands out as an 
uncharacteristically direct ICL mechanism for addressing famine at-
tendant to periods of armed conflict.  This crime is drawn directly 
                                                      
114 Id. at art 8(2)(b)(ii)-(iii), (vi), (xxi), (xxv). 
115 Id. at art (2)(c)(i)-(ii). 
116 Id. at art (2)(e)(v)(xii). 
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from Article 54(1) of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conven-
tions, which also prohibits starvation of civilians as a method of war-
fare and goes on to state: 
It is prohibited to [inter alia] remove or render useless objects 
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such 
as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of food-
stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and sup-
plies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of deny-
ing them their sustenance value to the civilian population . . . 
whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, 
cause them to move away or any other motive.117  
The language of Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) also specifically provides for 
the criminalization of acts which impede relief supplies as provided 
for under the Geneva Conventions.118  Specific references to civilian 
food rights are found in articles 23, 55, 59, 60 and 89 of the fourth 
Geneva Convention.119  Article 55 specifically references food rights 
of civilians in occupied territory, stating that “[t]o the fullest extent 
of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of 
ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population.”120  Arti-
cle 55 thus places an affirmative duty on an occupying military au-
thority to import necessary foodstuffs when civilian needs are not 
adequately met and forbids the requisition of food from civilian 
populations, especially if such requisition would lead to civilian 
shortages of food.  Additionally, Article 23 requires the “free pas-
sage of all consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics 
intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and mater-
nity cases,”121 although subject to limitation if there are “serious rea-
sons for fearing” such supplies will be “diverted from their destina-
tion” or “a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or 
economy of the enemy through the substitution of the above-men-
tioned consignments for goods which would otherwise be provided 
or produced by the enemy or through the release of such material, 
                                                      
117 Geneva I, supra note 97, at art. 54(1). 
118 Rome Statute, supra note 113, at art. 8(2)(b)(xxv) (listing as a war crime 
“[i]ntentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving 
them of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief 
supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions”). 
119 Geneva IV, supra note 97, at arts. 23, 55, 59, 60, 89. 
120 Id. at art. 55. 
121 Id. at art. 23. 
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services or facilities as would otherwise be required for the produc-
tion of such goods.”122  Article 59 requires the power occupying an 
inadequately supplied area to agree to relief schemes,123 although 
Article 60 states that accepting such “[r]elief consignments shall in 
no way relieve the Occupying Power of any of its responsibilities 
under Articles 55 . . . and 59.”124  Reference to these provisions 
demonstrates that the drafters of the Rome Statute clearly sought to 
criminalize both positive acts intended to cause starvation of civil-
ians and passive acts, such as refusing to permit or cooperate with 
outside humanitarian food relief efforts. 
Charges based on Article 8(2)(b)(xxv), however, have yet to be 
pursued at the ICC, although it appears that the pursuit of war 
crimes charges for intentionally starving civilians was at least con-
templated at the ICTY.  The experience of the ICTY is illustrative of 
how narrow the war crime of intentionally using starvation of civil-
ians as a method of warfare is.  First, the crime solely applies to in-
ternational armed conflicts, excluding internal conflicts, which are 
currently much more prevalent than true international wars.  Se-
cond, the crime includes a rather stringent mens rea of intent, which 
appears to limit the crime’s scope to only apply to instances where 
famine is induced as part of a specific strategy to starve civilians.  As 
such, other than in highly specialized circumstances, despite the rare 
inclusion of the word “starvation” within ICL, Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) 
of the Rome Statute appears to provide only narrow coverage over 
instances of famine and starvation attendant to armed conflicts. 
In the former Yugoslavia, a commission of legal experts ap-
pointed by the UN Security Council considered whether this crime 
was committed during the siege of Sarajevo but concluded, based 
on the “tendency of both sides [of the conflict] to control food, water 
and electricity for publicity purposes, the intermingling of military 
forces and the civilian population and the fact that no one appears 
to have died during the siege from starvation, dehydration or freez-
ing,” that the crime was inapplicable.125  Similarly, no attempts were 
made to prosecute the war crime of intentional starvation of civilians 
predicated on conditions in other affected areas where severe food 
                                                      
122 Id. at art. 23, subsections (a), (c). 
123 Id. at art. 59. 
124 Id. at art. 60. 
125 Final report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780 (1992), ¶ 205, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674/Add.2 (Vol. I) (May 31, 1995), 
[hereinafter ICTY UN Experts Report]. 
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shortages occurred during the Balkan conflict, such as in Srebrenica 
from 1992-1993, where famine conditions did reach the point of ac-
tual instances of civilian starvation.126  Quite understandably, the 
prosecution at the ICTY appears to have focused its resources con-
cerning Srebrenica on prosecuting crimes related to the notorious 
1995 genocidal massacre of thousands of Muslim men and boys.  
More recently, journalist Alex Perry has invoked the war crime of 
intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare to 
accuse the Somali government, at the behest of its Unites States mil-
itary advisors, of committing war crimes by impeding humanitarian 
food relief efforts destined for areas controlled by the Al-Shabaab 
militant group in 2011.127  Perry’s invocation of this particular war 
crime can be contrasted with the opinions of scholars such as Jens 
Ohlin and Andrew Jillions, who have argued that members of Al-
Shabaab should be prosecuted for crimes against humanity based 
on their role in the deadly 2011 famine.128  Famine has also become 
                                                      
126 For example, humanitarian conditions in and around Srebrenica deterio-
rated from 1992-1993 amidst conflict between Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim 
forces.  Serb forces destroyed the town’s water supply and in March of 1993, Gen-
eral Philippe Morillon of France, the Commander of the UN Protection Force 
(“UNPROFOR”) reported that “siege” conditions prevailed in Srebrenica.  Prose-
cutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-PT, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Judi-
cial Notice of Adjudicated Facts Pursuant to Rule 94(B), ¶¶ 22-23 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2009).  Genocide charges related to Srebrenica, 
however, have been predicated on the mass execution of Muslim men and boys 
from the area in 1995.  Indeed, the famine conditions in Srebrenica were dire enough 
that the ICTY Trial Chamber dropped charges of plunder as a war crime against 
accused Naser Orić for having participated in the alleged theft of several hundred 
cattle specifically because “any criminal responsibility” on the part of Orić was “off-
set by the real and present necessity to acquire food for the survival of the popula-
tion of Srebrenica.”  Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Oral Decision Rendered Pursuant to Rule 98bis in the Orić Case, U.N. 
Press Release CVO/MOW/974e (June 8, 2005), 
http://www.icty.org/en/press/oral-decision-rendered-pursuant-rule-98bis-oric-
case [https://perma.cc/66SV-VSA9]. 
127 Tremonti, supra note 11. 
128 Ohlin, supra note 5; see Andrew Jillions, The (in)Justice of Famine: Is al-Shabaab 
Guilty of a Crime Against Humanity?, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT, Aug. 15, 2011, http://jus-
ticeinconflict.org/2011/08/15/the-injustice-of-famine-is-al-shabaab-guilty-of-a-
crime-against-humanity/ [https://perma.cc/X5WH-78ZB] (arguing that famine 
meets the threshold for a crime against humanity, and that members of Al-Shabaab 
should be prosecuted for such based on their role in the 2011 Somali famine).  It 
should be noted that the conclusions of Ohlin and Jillions do not necessarily conflict 
with that of Perry, as it remains entirely possible that opposing factions can both 
commit international crimes in relation to a single famine event.  In the Somali sit-
uation, the Somali government and its allies could theoretically have committed the 
war crime of intentionally using starvation of civilians to weaken Al-Shabaab, 
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a major issue in the Syrian civil war, particularly in the besieged 
town of Madaya, to the point that UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon has accused all factions—the Assad government, rebel groups 
and Islamic State militants—of the war crime of using starvation as 
a weapon of war.129 
Ultimately, war crimes present various opportunities to address 
famines occurring during periods of armed conflict in ICL prosecu-
tions.  Generally speaking, in light of the narrow language of using 
starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, the more general lan-
guage of other war crimes may actually provide more useful ap-
proaches to prosecuting certain other famine-inducing acts under 
the aegis of war crimes.  For example, the UN commission of experts 
for the former Yugoslavia did conclude the war crime of inhumane 
acts was likely being committed against certain non-Serb detainees 
based on findings of “patterns of abuse” including evidence that: 
prisoners [were] nearly starved to death and, at best, are 
given one meal a day consisting of meagre portions of thin 
soup and bread. In instances where food is delivered to a 
camp by the [International Committee of the Red Cross], the 
food is not distributed to prisoners as intended [but] is re-
tained for the Bosnian-Serb fighting forces or . . . the camp 
guards.130 
                                                      
which itself may have committed crimes against humanity by not allowing starving 
civilians to leave the areas it controlled, misappropriating foodstuffs and food aid, 
and by kidnapping and murdering numerous foreign aid workers. 
129 U.N. Security-General, Full transcript of Secretary-General’s press encoun-
ter following briefing to the General Assembly on his Priorities for 2016 (Jan. 14, 
2016), http://www.un.org/sg/offthecuff/index.asp?nid=4316 
[https://perma.cc/Z6UP-TEKB] [hereinafter Full transcript of Secretary-General’s 
press encounter] (“Let me be clear: the use of starvation as a weapon of war is a war 
crime.  All sides—including the Syrian government which has the primary respon-
sibility to protect Syrians—are committing this and other atrocious acts prohibited 
under international humanitarian law.”); see also Diana Semaan, Madaya shocked the 
world but this story isn’t over, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Jan. 15, 2016, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/01/madaya-shocked-the-
world-but-this-story-isnt-over/ [https://perma.cc/XDR4-NGUP] (describing con-
ditions of hunger faced by civilians in Madaya); SYRIA: ‘LEFT TO DIE UNDER SIEGE’: 
WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN EASTERN GHOUTA, SYRIA, AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/docu-
ment/?indexNumber=mde24%2f2079%2f2015&language=en 
[https://perma.cc/A5AZ-QSML] (describing the humanitarian crisis in Eastern 
Ghouta). 
130 ICTY UN Experts Report, supra note 125, at ¶ 230(p). 
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These and other acts of starving and otherwise mistreating de-
tainees were prosecuted extensively at the ICTY as both crimes 
against humanity and war crimes.  For example, Milorad Krnojelac 
was found convicted under the doctrine of superior responsibility 
of the war crime of cruel treatment as a breach of Common Article 3 
of the Geneva Conventions for the living conditions enforced on 
non-Serb detainees at the Kazneno-Popravni Dom (KP Dom) prison 
where he served as warden.131  A major aspect of the living condi-
tions that contributed to their rising to the level of cruel treatment as 
a war crime was the provision of “starvation rations” to non-Serb 
prisoners.132  In Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, the Trial Chamber noted that 
“[p]erhaps the most marked contrast between the treatment of Serbs 
and non-Serbs was with regard to food, both in quantity and in qual-
ity.”133 
Additional war crimes provisions may also criminalize certain 
famine-inducing behavior in certain circumstances.  Two especially 
relevant crimes are those of pillage and destruction or seizure of the 
property of an adversary not imperatively demanded by the neces-
sities of the conflict under customary law and codified in Rome Stat-
ute Articles 8(2)(e)(v) and (xii).  These two property crimes can be 
committed during any armed conflict and, being grounded in cus-
tomary law and not the Geneva Conventions, need not be directed 
only against civilians in occupied territory.  The strength of these 
crimes and other similar war crimes provisions protecting property 
during armed conflicts, is that they criminalize acts of property theft 
and destruction, which are often key factors contributing to famine 
during a period of armed conflict.  The weakness of the crimes is 
that if used to prosecute individuals for stealing or destroying food-
stuffs or food-production equipment, such prosecutions would be 
for those specific acts themselves and would not therefore, reflect 
any direct culpability for resulting famine conditions.  Nonetheless, 
protecting civilian property rights during periods of armed conflict 
is an important aspect of famine deterrence.  Moving forward, 
should the Darfur cases ever go to trial at the ICC, issues of famine 
                                                      
131 Prosecutor v. Krnojelac (Foča), Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgement, ¶ 499 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 2002) (finding Milorad Krnojelac 
responsible for two counts of aiding and abetting). 
132 Id. at ¶¶ 439-43 (discussing the Prosecution’s argument of inhumane con-
ditions of Muslim and other non-Serb civilian detainees as persecution).  
133 Id. at ¶ 442 (discussing the quantity and quality of food as part of the inhu-
mane conditions). 
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resulting from acts of pillage and destruction in the Darfur region 
will likely be discussed and considered at trial, as such acts are al-
leged to have formed part of a plan to destroy civilian food and wa-
ter sources within targeted areas.134  Thus, moving forward, these 
and other specialized war crimes may provide a beachhead for the 
discussion of famine issues within ICL.  If ICL accountability is ever 
pursued in relation to the situation in Somalia during the past dec-
ade, or in relation to the ongoing conflict in Syria, additional pro-
gress may be made towards the prosecution of famine-related war 
crimes. 
 
3.3.  Crimes against Humanity 
 
The term “crimes against humanity” refers to a group of offences 
that are elevated to the level of international crimes when commit-
ted as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian 
population.  The term was first used in reference to possible criminal 
sanctions on 28 May 1915, when the French, British and Russian 
Governments issued a declaration condemning the mass killing of 
Armenians in the Turkish Ottoman Empire, calling the killings “new 
crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilization” and denounc-
ing the acts of “all members of the Ottoman Empire . . . who are 
implicated in such massacres.”135  This declaration did not result in 
any prosecutions, nor were any realistically contemplated at the 
time, but the language of the declaration sowed the seeds for a new 
category of international crimes that were eventually prosecuted ex-
tensively in the aftermath of World War II.136 
                                                      
134 For example, under count 38 listed in the warrant for his arrest, Ali Kushayb 
is charged with “burning of dwellings and the destruction of crops and farms.”  
Prosecutor v. Harun, ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant for the Arrest of Ali Kushayb, ¶ 13 
(Apr. 27, 2007) (raising the issue of jurisdiction for warrants to arrest). 
135 Original language available in the dispatch of the US Ambassador in France 
(Sharp) to the Secretary of State [telegram] (May 29, 1915), image of telegram available 
at  http://www.armenian-genocide.org/popup/affirmation_window.html?Affir-
mation=160 [https://perma.cc/256Q-ZRMD]; see also CASSESE, supra note 71, at 101. 
136 See International Military Tribunal for the Far East Charter, art 5(c), Jan. 19, 
1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, available at http://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/li-
brary/treaties/04/4-06/military-tribunal-far-east.xml [hereinafter IMTFE Charter] 
(stating the jurisdiction requirement for crimes against humanity); see also Control 
Council Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace 
and Against Humanity, art II(1)(a), Dec. 20, 1945, Official Gazette of the Control 
Council for Germany, no. 3, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt10.asp 
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As a body of law criminalizing the widespread or systematic 
abuse of civilians, crimes against humanity presents a framework 
that appears highly conducive to effectively scrutinizing and ac-
counting for modern famine scenarios.  Indeed, some of the earliest 
prosecutions of crimes against humanity, for example, those of Eich-
mann in Israel and Hans Frank at the IMT, resulted in convictions 
based at least partially on enforcing starvation conditions on civil-
ians.137 
These early applications however, failed to elucidate precisely 
how the enforcement of famine conditions on a civilian population 
interacted with the elements of specific crimes against humanity.  
For example, the IMT simply found Frank guilty of various crimes 
against humanity based on his contribution to a variety of methods 
of abuse and killing utilized by the Nazi Party against civilian Jews 
and Poles, without connecting specific actions by Frank and result-
ant harms to specific crimes against humanity.138  The issue of fam-
ine and starvation as subjects of crimes against humanity has since 
largely languished.  For example, prosecutions at the ICTY and 
ICTR have involved factual scenarios mostly involving classical in-
ternational crimes of direct, interpersonal violence, rather than in-
volving large-scale and severe civilian famines involving mass 
death.  The Khmer Rouge period, in contrast to the situations in the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, presents an instance of a particu-
larly virulent and directly caused famine affecting millions of vic-
tims, rendering this famine an ideal entry point for an ICL response 
generally and the invocation of crimes against humanity specifi-
cally.  The remainder of this section provides an overview of the pre-
requisite chapeau elements universal to all crimes against humanity 
and examines how these requirements, along with the elements of 
three specific crimes against humanity—extermination, persecution 
and other inhumane acts—interact with famine. 
 
 
 
                                                      
[hereinafter Control Council Law No. 10] (stating the acts considered to be crimes 
against peace); see also CASSESE, supra note 71 at 101-06. 
137 Eichmann Judgement, supra note 16; IMT Judgement, supra note 17, at 296-
98 (convicting accused Hans Frank of war crimes and crimes against humanity 
predicated on the treatment of civilians in occupied Poland). 
138 See IMT Judgement, supra note 17, at 298 (convicting Frank based on his 
“willing and knowing” participation in acts of terrorism and exploitation). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss4/2
  
2017] Conceptualizing Famine  1151 
3.3.1.  Chapeau Elements: The Widespread or Systematic Attack 
against a Civilian Population 
 
Historically, in order to differentiate crimes against humanity 
from ordinary domestic crimes, crimes against humanity were 
linked with war crimes and it was necessary to demonstrate a nexus 
between any alleged crime against humanity and an armed conflict.  
At the IMT and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(“IMTFE”) in Tokyo, crimes against humanity could only be “com-
mitted in connection with either war crimes or an aggressive 
war.”139  The various special courts established under Control Coun-
cil Law 10 in each of the allied-controlled sections of Germany 
dropped this requirement, apparently removing the requirement 
that crimes against humanity be committed in connection with war 
crimes or crimes against peace.140  Since these early prosecutions, the 
requirement that crimes against humanity form part of an attack 
against a civilian population has replaced the abandoned require-
ment of some connection with an armed conflict or the crime of ag-
gression.141  This requirement of a widespread or systematic attack 
against civilians is typically referred to as a contextual or “chapeau” 
element, as it is common to all crimes against humanity.142  This cha-
peau requirement can be subdivided into five distinct elements: (1) 
an attack; that is (2) either widespread or systematic; (3) directed 
against a civilian population; (4) the actus reus of the accused must 
                                                      
139 Stuart K. Ford, Crimes against Humanity at the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia: Is a Connection with Armed Conflict Required?, 24 UCLA Pac. Basin 
L.J. 125, 144 (2007); see also IMT Charter, supra note 94, at art 5(c); IMTFE Charter, 
supra note 6, at art 5(c). 
140 Id. at 147-48 (discussing war crimes, crimes against peace and crimes 
against humanity contained in the Control Council Law No. 10). 
141 See generally Tadić, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 103, at ¶¶ 
96-137. 
142 Id. at 99, 109 (“At present, [international criminal law] always requires for 
[crimes against humanity] a general context of criminal conduct, consisting of a 
widespread or systematic practice of unlawful attacks against the population.”); see 
also Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia art. 5, 
May 25, 1993, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Stat-
ute/statute_sept09_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/T94U-WL7Y]; Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 3, Nov. 8, 1994, available at 
http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/100131_Stat-
ute_en_fr_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8JV-EWGD]; Rome Statute, supra note 113, at 
art. 7(1); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 2, Aug. 14, 2000, available 
at http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/scsl-statute.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Y7K-
24KW]. 
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form part of the attack; and (5) the accused must be aware of his 
participation therein (mens rea).143 
 
3.3.1.1.  The Attack 
 
The Rome Statute is the only codified international legal instru-
ment that defines “attack,” describing it as a “course of conduct in-
volving the multiple commission of [enumerated specific crimes 
against humanity] against any civilian population, pursuant to or in 
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such at-
tack.”144  This definition adds an additional “policy” requirement, 
unique to the ICC,145 but otherwise reflects the expansive view of the 
term “attack” under customary law.146  In the ICTY case of Prosecutor 
v. Kunarac, the Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s defi-
                                                      
143 See, e.g., Tadić, Appeal Judgement, supra note 107, at ¶ 248; Kunarac, Appeal 
Judgement, supra note 106, at ¶ 85; Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-T, 
Judgement, ¶ 28 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 2002) (distil-
ling the customary chapeau elements of crimes against humanity into five distinct 
requirements, albeit in a different order). 
144 Rome Statute, supra note 113, at art 7(2)(a); see also Akayesu, Trial Judge-
ment, supra note 61, at ¶ 581 (“An attack may also be non violent in nature, like 
imposing a system of apartheid . . . or exerting pressure on the population to act in 
a particular manner, may come under the purview of an attack, if orchestrated on 
a massive scale or in a systematic manner.”). 
145 See, e.g., CASSESE, supra note 71, at 125 (observing that “[i]t would seem that 
the [Rome] Statute requires that the offender, in committing a crime against hu-
manity, pursue or promote [a State organizational policy to commit the alleged at-
tack]” and concluding that “[c]learly, this requirement [of a State or organizational 
policy] goes beyond what is required under international customary law”); see also 
Kunarac, Appeal Judgement, supra note 106, at ¶ 98 (holding that “neither the attack 
nor the acts of the accused needs to be supported by any form of ‘policy’ or ‘plan.’ 
There was nothing in the Statute or in customary international law at the time of 
the alleged acts which required proof of the existence of a plan or policy to commit 
these crimes.”) (internal citations omitted).  For an overview of customary interna-
tional law sources supporting the position that there is no policy requirement for 
crimes against humanity, see id. at ¶ 98 n. 114.  It remains unclear what the precise 
requirements of the policy element are at the ICC.  See DARRYL ROBINSON, Crimes 
Against Humanity: A Better Policy on ‘Policy,’ in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 705 (Carsten Stahn ed. 2014). 
146 See generally CASSESE, supra note 71, at 124–26 (outlining the elements of ar-
ticle 7 of the Rome Statute and noting that some aspects of the article are both nar-
rower and broader than customary international law). 
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nition of an “attack” as “a course of conduct involving the commis-
sion of acts of violence.”147  The Appeals Chamber attack further 
opined that the requisite attack is “not limited to the use of armed 
force [but] encompasses any mistreatment of the civilian popula-
tion.”148 
Under this expansive definition, it appears clear that enacting 
harsh policies that lead directly to famine can form part of the req-
uisite attack necessary for crimes against humanity liability.  For ex-
ample, the ICTR Trial Chamber held that one example of such an 
attack is “exerting pressure on the population to act in a particular 
manner . . . if orchestrated on a massive scale or a systematic man-
ner.”149  Furthermore, there is ample support in ICL jurisprudence 
for the proposition that general mistreatment may qualify as the req-
uisite “attack” so long as such mistreatment is either widespread or 
systematic.150 
                                                      
147 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgement, ¶ 
415 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001); aff’d Kunarac, Appeal 
Judgement, supra note 106, at ¶ 89. 
148 Kunarac, Appeal Judgement, supra note 106, at ¶ 86.  For example, in Kuna-
rac, the requisite “attack” chapeau requirement of crimes against humanity was 
held to be satisfied.  The Trial Chamber found that during the relevant period there 
was “an extensive attack by the Serb forces targeting the Muslim civilian popula-
tion” in the municipalities of Foča, Gacko and Kalinovik.  Kunarac, Trial Judge-
ment, supra note 147, at ¶ 570.  The Trial Chamber found that the attack consisted 
of the creation of an “atmosphere of intimidation” imposed on the local Muslim 
population, marked by, inter alia, ostracism, violent outbursts (including numerous 
beatings and killings), house-burning, gender segregation, arbitrary detainment 
with insufficient food in “intolerably unhygienic conditions” and the systematic 
rape and sexual assault of women and young girls (id. at ¶¶ 570-578).  The findings 
of the Trial Chamber in Kunarac illustrate the fact that various forms of mistreat-
ment, both clearly violent (e.g. beatings and killings) and non-violent (e.g. gender 
segregation and insufficient provision of food) can form part of the requisite attack.  
Furthermore, the prosecution may prove the existence of the attack by offering ev-
idence that other, unindicted crimes were committed as part of the overall attack.  
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Judgement, ¶ 890 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2009).  That the requisite attack need not 
involve the commission of acts of violence is not universally agreed upon.  How-
ever, given the wide degree of definitional variation and contestation concerning 
what constitutes “violence” such differences may simply reflect differing underly-
ing viewpoints concerning the definition of violence.  In this regard, see SCHMID, 
supra note 19, at 76-80. 
149 Akayesu, Trial Judgement, supra note 61, at ¶ 581; accord Musema, Trial 
Judgement, supra note 56, at ¶ 205. 
150 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Renzaho, Case No. ICTR-97-31-T, Judgement and 
Sentence, ¶ 782 (July 14, 2009) (“An attack against a civilian population means the 
perpetration against that population of a series of acts of violence, or of the kind of 
mistreatment [that rises to the level of an enumerated crime against humanity].”) 
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3.3.1.2.  Widespread or Systematic 
 
One key feature of all crimes against humanity differentiating 
them from domestic crimes is their massive scale or highly orga-
nized nature.151  In order to reach this threshold, an alleged crime 
against humanity must form part of an attack that is either “wide-
spread” or “systematic,” rather than being a mere isolated instance 
of criminal behavior.152  The ICTR Trial Chamber commented that 
“[a] widespread attack is an attack on a large scale directed against 
a multiplicity of victims, whereas a systematic attack is one carried 
out pursuant to a preconceived policy or plan.”153  It is well-settled 
law that these requirements are alternative and not cumulative.154 
Within crimes against humanity jurisprudence, the term “wide-
spread” refers to the scale and number of victims.  The ICTR Trial 
Chamber has defined “widespread” as “massive, frequent, large-
scale action, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness 
and directed against a multiplicity of victims.”155  The alternative re-
quirement of a “systematic” attack refers to whether the attack 
                                                      
(citing Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 
2165 (Dec. 18, 2008)) (citing Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, 
Judgement, ¶¶ 915-918 (Nov. 28, 2007)); Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case No. IT-95-14/2-
A, Appeal Judgement, ¶ 666 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 
2004); Kunarac, Appeal Judgement, supra note 106, at ¶ 89; Kunarac, Trial Judge-
ment, supra note 147, at ¶ 415. 
151 See CASSESE, supra note 71, at 99 (“Let us now return to the large-scale or 
massive nature of crimes against humanity. That this feature is a necessary ingre-
dient may be inferred from the first provisions setting out a list of such offences. 
They clearly, if implicitly, required that the offence, to constitute an attack on hu-
manity, be of extreme gravity and not be a sporadic event but part of a pattern of 
misconduct.”); see also Akayesu, Trial Judgement, supra note 61, at ¶ 579. 
152 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 113, at art. 7 (“For the purpose of this Stat-
ute ‘crime against humanity’ means any of the following acts when committed as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian popula-
tion.”); see also Akayesu, Trial Judgement, supra note 61, at ¶ 579. 
153  Bagilishema, Trial Judgement, supra note 71, at ¶ 77 (internal citation omit-
ted). 
154 See, e.g., Tadić, Appeal Judgement, supra note 107, at ¶ 248; Kunarac, Appeal 
Judgement, supra note 106, at ¶¶ 93, 97; Musema, Trial Judgement, supra note 56, at 
¶ 203. 
155 Akayesu, Trial Judgement, supra note 61, at ¶ 580; see also International Law 
Commission, Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind with com-
mentaries, art. 18, comment 4, in 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n. 47, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.l (Part 2) [hereinafter 1996 ILC Draft Code] (noting that 
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2017] Conceptualizing Famine  1155 
forms part of an organized effort to abuse civilians.  The commen-
tary to the International Law Commission’s 1996 Draft Code of 
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind defines “system-
atic” as “pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy . . . [t]he imple-
mentation of [which] could result in the repeated or continuous 
commission of inhuman acts.”156  The ICTY Trial Chamber provided 
a more detailed definition in its judgement in Prosecutor v. Blaškić, 
distilling four factors to consider in assessing the systemic nature of 
an alleged attack: 
(1) the existence of a political objective, a plan pursuant to 
which the attack is perpetrated or an ideology, in the broad 
sense of the word, that is, to destroy persecute or weaken a 
community 
(2) the perpetration of a criminal act on a very large scale 
against a group of civilians or the repeated and continuous 
commission of inhumane acts linked to one another 
(3) the preparation and use of significant public or private 
resources, whether military or other 
(4) the implication of high level political and/or military au-
thorities in the definition and establishment of the methodi-
cal plan.157 
The Chamber in Blaškić also held that the plan itself need not be 
declared expressly but “may be surmised from the occurrence of a 
series of events.”158  The ICTY Appeals Chamber elaborated on how 
a systematic attack can be inferred in Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., find-
ing that the “[p]atterns of crimes” necessary to satisfy the systematic 
requirement can be inferred based on an analysis of the “improba-
bility of their random occurrence.”159  As a result, even a single crim-
inal act may constitute a crime against humanity when committed 
                                                      
the “[widespread] alternative requires that the inhumane acts be committed ‘on a 
large scale’ meaning that the acts are directed against a multiplicity of victims”). 
156 Id. at art. 18, comment 3. 
157 Blaškić, Trial Judgement, supra note 101, at ¶ 203 (internal citations omit-
ted). 
158 Id. at ¶ 204. 
159 Kunarac, Trial Judgement, supra note 147, at ¶ 429; aff’d Kunarac, Appeal 
Judgement, supra note 106, at ¶ 94.  In practice, there is often significant evidentiary 
overlap in analyzing whether an attack is widespread and/or systematic.  For ex-
ample, in Kunarac, the Appeals Chamber considered “[t]he consequences of the at-
tack upon the targeted population, the number of victims, the nature of the acts, the 
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pursuant to a larger, organized assault on a civilian population.160  
Famines, which by their very nature are widespread and affect nu-
merous victims, would seemingly always qualify as “wide-
spread,”161 and if famine conditions resulted pursuant to an orga-
nized plan or set of policies, it is also likely that this scenario would 
also satisfy the alternative “systematic” requirement.  For example, 
the Khmer Rouge period famine was clearly widespread, as it af-
fected virtually the entire Cambodian population and killed civil-
ians throughout large swaths of the country.162  Moreover, the main 
policies causing this famine were part of official national policy and 
as such, systematically enforced starvation conditions throughout 
the country.163 
 
3.3.1.3.  Against a Civilian Population 
 
 Crimes against humanity are limited to instances where a civil-
ian–as opposed to military–population is the target of widespread 
or systematic abuses. According to current jurisprudence, “the use 
of the word ‘population’ does not mean that the entire population 
of the geographical entity in which the attack is taking place must 
have been subjected to that attack.”164  Instead, the prosecution must 
demonstrate that “enough individuals were targeted in the course 
                                                      
possible participation of officials or authorities or any identifiable patterns of 
crimes,” in determining “whether the attack satisfies either or both requirements of 
a ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’ attack vis-à-vis [the specific] civilian population.”  Id. 
at ¶ 95.  This is to be expected and in most cases both requirements are satisfied or 
fail, based on the same evidence. 
160 See, e.g., Kunarac, Trial Judgement, supra note 147, at ¶ 431 (“A single act 
could therefore be regarded as a crime against humanity if it takes place in the rel-
evant context.”) (citing Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement, ¶ 
550 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000)); Prosecutor v. Tadić, 
Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgement (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo-
slavia May 7, 1997) at ¶ 649; accord Kunarac, Appeal Judgement, supra note 106, at 
¶ 96 (“[T]he acts of the accused need only be a part of this attack and, all other 
conditions being met, a single or relatively limited number of acts on his or her part 
would qualify as a crime against humanity, unless those acts may be said to be 
isolated or random.”). 
161 This limitation would likely exclude periods of food scarcity or chronic un-
dernourishment that fail to rise to the level of famine. 
162 See generally DeFalco, Justice and Starvation in Cambodia, supra note 9. 
163 For an overview of these policies and how they created and maintained 
famine conditions, see id. 
164 Kunarac, Appeal Judgement, supra note 106, at ¶ 90. 
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of the attack, or that they were targeted in such a way as to satisfy 
the Chamber that the attack was in fact directed against a civilian 
‘population’, rather than against a limited and randomly selected 
number of individuals.”165  Furthermore, the expression “directed 
against” has been interpreted by the ICTY Appeals Chamber as 
specifying that the civilian population must be “the primary rather 
than incidental target of the attack.”166  To determine whether the 
civilian population was the subject of the attack the same Chamber 
has directed Trial Chambers to: 
consider, inter alia, the means and method used in the course 
of the attack, the status of the victims, their number, the dis-
criminatory nature of the attack, the nature of the crimes 
committed in its course, the resistance to the assailants at the 
time and the extent to which the attacking force may be said 
to have complied or attempted to comply with the precau-
tionary requirements of the laws of war.167 
Accordingly, the civilian population in question may vary based 
on the size and scope of the alleged attack.168  Additionally, the at-
tack itself need not be directed against the entire civilian population 
in a given area, but may target a specific group from amongst the 
larger civilian community.169 
 
 
 
                                                      
165 Id. 
166 Id. at ¶ 91. 
167 Id. 
168 For example, in Lukić, the ICTY Trial Chamber found that there existed a 
widespread or systematic attack against the Muslim civilian population of 
Višegrad.  Lukić, Trial Judgement, supra note 148 at ¶¶ 889-95. 
169 See id. at ¶ 891 (finding that the requisite “attacks were directed in a dis-
criminatory manner against the civilian population; the victims were civilians from 
Višegrad, many were elderly and women and children, and all were Muslims”).  
Indeed, a population retains its civilian character even if it contains some non-civil-
ian members, so long as the attack itself primarily targets civilians.  See, e.g., Blaškić, 
Trial Judgement, supra note 101, at ¶ 214 (holding that “it can be concluded that the 
presence of soldiers within an intentionally targeted civilian population does not 
alter the civilian nature of that population”); see also Tadić, Trial Judgement, supra 
note 160, at ¶ 639; Akayesu, Trial Judgement, supra note 61, at ¶ 582; Kayishema, 
Trial Judgement, supra note 69, at ¶ 128. 
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3.3.1.4.  Chapeau Actus Reus 
 
Simply committing a crime during an unrelated widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population is insufficient to turn 
a simple domestic crime into a crime against humanity.  The crimi-
nal acts of the specific accused must form part of the overall attack 
against a civilian population.170  The contribution of the accused, 
however, need not be a sine qua non for the overall attack, as the com-
mission of crimes against humanity often involves numerous perpe-
trators spread widely across time and space.171  In fact, liability is 
still possible in instances where the accused commits a single un-
lawful act before or after the overall attack, provided the act is not 
found to be “isolated” from the attack.172  The ICTY Appeals Cham-
ber has defined an “isolated act” as one “so far removed from that 
attack that, having considered the context and circumstances in 
which it was committed, it cannot reasonably be said to have been 
part of the attack.”173 
 
3.3.1.5.  Chapeau Mens Rea 
 
Crimes against humanity can only be committed by a perpetra-
tor who is aware of the larger criminal context of his actions.  Ac-
cording to ICTY jurisprudence, the accused must simply “know that 
                                                      
170 See, e.g., Tadić, Appeal Judgement, supra note 107, at ¶ 248 (“The Appeals 
Chamber agrees that it may be inferred from the words “directed against any civil-
ian population” in Article 5 of the Statute that the acts of the accused must comprise 
part of a pattern of widespread or systematic crimes directed against a civilian pop-
ulation.”) (citing Prosecutor v. Mrkšić (“Vukovar Hospital”), Case No. IT-95-13-
R61-T, Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, ¶ 30 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 1996)); accord 
Kunarac, Appeal Judgement, supra note 106, at ¶ 96 (observing that “the acts of the 
accused need only be a part of this attack” in order to satisfy the chapeau element of 
crimes against humanity). 
171 See, e.g., Kunarac, Appeal Judgement, supra note 106, at ¶ 96 (noting that 
“all other conditions being met, a single or relatively limited number of acts on his 
or her part would qualify as a crime against humanity, unless those acts may be 
said to be isolated or random.”); see also Tadić, Appeal Judgement, supra note 107, 
at ¶ 271 (holding that “to convict an accused of crimes against humanity, it must be 
proved that the crimes were related to the attack on a civilian population”) (empha-
sis in original). 
172 Id. at ¶ 100. 
173 Id. 
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his acts constitute part of a pattern of widespread or systematic 
crimes directed against a civilian population and [must also] know 
that his acts fit into such a pattern.”174  As for knowledge of the spe-
cifics of the attack and the nature of his participation therein, the 
ICTY Trial Chamber has held that it is “sufficient that [the accused] 
merely understood the overall context in which his acts took place” 
and with such understanding, “took the risk that his acts were part 
of the attack.”175  As is the norm under ICL, the accused’s subjective 
motivation for participating in the commission of a crime against 
humanity is irrelevant.176  Additionally, according to the ICTY Ap-
peals Chamber, it is inconsequential whether the accused’s acts tar-
geted a specific individual, rather than the civilian population in 
general, as “it is the attack, not the acts of the accused, which must 
be directed against the civilian population.”177 
 
3.3.2.  Specific Crimes against Humanity:  Extermination, 
Persecution and Other Inhumane Acts 
 
Establishing that an accused’s alleged criminal actions formed 
part of the requisite widespread or systematic attack on a civilian 
population is only the first step towards a conviction for crimes 
against humanity, as the prosecution must further prove the ele-
ments of each specific charged crime against humanity beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Three specific crimes against humanity stand out 
as potential candidates for addressing many famine scenarios: ex-
termination, persecution and other inhumane acts.178  Meanwhile, in 
                                                      
174 Lukić, Trial Judgement, supra note 148, at ¶ 877 (citing Kunarac, Appeal 
Judgement, supra note 106, at ¶ 85). 
175 Lukić, Trial Judgement, supra note 148, at ¶ 877. 
176 For a thorough discussion of why the subjective motivation of an individual 
accused with crimes against humanity is irrelevant, see Tadić, Appeal Judgement, 
supra note 107, at ¶¶ 247-272; accord Lukić, Trial Judgement, supra note 148, at ¶ 877 
(“The accused’s motives for participating in the attack are irrelevant as well as 
whether the accused intended his acts to be directed against the targeted popula-
tion or merely against his victim.”) (citing Kunarac, Appeal Judgement, supra note 
106, at ¶¶ 103, 105). 
177 Lukić, Trial Judgement, supra note 148, at ¶ 877 (citing Kunarac, Appeal 
Judgement, supra note 106, at ¶¶ 103, 105). 
178 The author has previously proposed the use of these three crimes against 
humanity as a framework for addressing the Khmer Rouge era famine at the ECCC.  
DeFalco, Accounting for Famine, supra note 5.  Diana Kearney has also emphasized 
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certain circumstances additional crimes against humanity, such as 
those of apartheid or slavery, could be implicated.  The remainder 
of this section explores the elements of extermination, persecution 
and other inhumane acts in relation to the enforcement of famine 
conditions on a civilian population. 
 
3.3.2.1.  Extermination 
 
The crime against humanity of extermination is a crime of mass 
killing.179  Such killing can be achieved by any means, including 
“subjecting a number of people to conditions of living that would 
inevitably lead to death.”180  Both the ICTR and ICTY have stated 
that the actus reus of extermination covers “any act, omission, or 
combination thereof which contributes directly or indirectly to the 
killing of a large number of individuals.”181  One example of the ac-
tus reus of extermination provided by the ICTR Trial Chamber is 
“[i]mprisoning a large number of people and withholding the neces-
sities of life which results in mass death.”182  Similarly, the Rome 
                                                      
the suitability of these three specific crimes against humanity for the pursuit of ICL 
famine accountability.  See Kearney, supra note 40. 
179 See Lukić, Trial Judgement, supra note 148, at ¶ 937 (citing Prosecutor v. 
Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, Judgement, ¶ 189 (Mar. 12, 2008)); Prosecutor 
v. Stakić (“Prijedor”), Case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgement, ¶ 259 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006); Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case Nos. 
ICTR-96-10-A & ICTR-96-17-A, Judgement, ¶ 516 (Dec. 13, 2004); Bagosora, Trial 
Judgement, supra note 150 at ¶ 2191; Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, 
Judgement, ¶ 62 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007). 
180 See Ntakirutimana, Appeal Judgement, supra note 179, at ¶ 522; accord 
Stakić, Appeal Judgement, supra note 179, at ¶ 259. 
181 Seromba, Appeals Judgement, supra note 179, at ¶ 189 (citing Prosecutor v. 
Brđanin (“Krajina”), Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement, ¶ 389 (Sept. 1, 2004)); see also 
Bagosora, Trial Judgement, supra note 150, at ¶ 2191; Lukić, Trial Judgement, supra 
note 148, at ¶ 937. 
182 Kayishema, Trial Judgement, supra note 69, at ¶ 146 (The accused were not 
convicted of extermination because the Trial Chamber found that under the specific 
circumstances, the conviction of the accused for genocide subsumed the charges of 
murder and extermination as crimes against humanity.); see also Brđanin, Trial 
Judgement, supra note 181, at ¶ 389 (“An act amounting to extermination may in-
clude the killing of a victim as such as well as conduct which creates conditions 
provoking the victim’s death and ultimately mass killings, such as the deprivation 
of food and medicine, calculated to cause the destruction of part of the popula-
tion.”). 
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Statute explicitly includes the “deprivation of access to food and 
medicine” as acts that may satisfy the actus reus of extermination.183 
 
3.3.2.1.1.  The Massiveness Threshold 
 
The crime against humanity of extermination is–along with gen-
ocide–perhaps the most heinous crime in existence, as its commis-
sion necessarily involves mass killing.184  It is this critical element of 
massiveness that sets extermination apart from simple murder.185  
There is no numerical threshold of victims that automatically estab-
lishes massiveness as a matter of law.186  Instead, each case requires 
                                                      
183 Rome Statute, supra note 113, at art 7(2)(b).  Moreover, extermination 
charges are well suited to address the culpability of leaders of repressive regimes, 
as they are appropriately brought against individuals who “did in fact exercise au-
thority or power over many other individuals or did otherwise have the capacity to 
be instrumental in the killing of a large number of individuals.”  Vasiljević, Trial 
Judgement, supra note 143, at ¶ 222 (“It is worth noting that in none of the reviewed 
[post-World War II] cases were minor figures charged with ‘extermination’ as a 
crime against humanity.  Those who were charged with that criminal offence did 
in fact exercise authority or power over many other individuals or did otherwise 
have the capacity to be instrumental in the killing of a large number of individu-
als.”); accord Brđanin, Trial Judgement, supra note 181, at ¶ 390. 
184 Although there is no formal hierarchy of international crimes, which are all 
considered especially grave in nature, extermination is often described as “similar 
to genocide” and of equal gravity thereto.  See, e.g., Krstić, Trial Judgement, supra 
note 59, at ¶ 497. 
185 See, e.g., Lukić, Trial Judgement, supra note 148, at ¶ 938 (“The crime of ex-
termination differs from murder in that it requires an element of mass destruc-
tion.”) (citing Stakić, Appeal Judgement, supra note 179, at ¶¶ 259, 260 (“The mens 
rea of extermination clearly requires the intention to kill on a large scale or to sys-
tematically subject a large number of people to conditions of living that would lead 
to their deaths.  This intent is a clear reflection of the actus reus of the crime.”)); 
Ntakirutimana, Appeal Judgement, supra note 179, at ¶ 522; Bagosora, Trial Judge-
ment, supra note 150, at ¶ 2191 (“The mens rea of extermination requires that the 
accused intended to kill persons on a massive scale or to subject a large number of 
people to conditions of living that would lead to their deaths in a widespread or 
systematic manner.”); Brđanin, Trial Judgement, supra note 181, at ¶ 395 (“The Pros-
ecution is . . . required [in order to obtain an extermination conviction] to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that that accused had the intention to kill persons on a 
massive scale or create the conditions of life that led to the deaths of a large number 
of people.”); aff’d Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgement, ¶ 476 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2007). 
186 See, e.g., Lukić, Trial Judgement, supra note 148, at ¶ 938, (citing Stakić, Ap-
peal Judgement, supra note 179, at ¶ 260); Ntakirutimana, Appeal Judgement, supra 
note 179, at ¶ 516; Krstić, Appeal Judgement, supra note 58, at ¶ 501; Prosecutor v. 
Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgement, ¶ 573 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005); Brđanin, Appeal Judgement, supra note 185, at ¶¶ 471-72; 
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a careful analysis of relevant factors, including: “the time and place 
of the killings, the selection of the victims, and the manner in which 
they were targeted.”187  Judges at the ICTR and ICTY have held that 
individual victims however, need not be named or described,188 or 
share “any common national, ethnical, racial or religious character-
istics” beyond comprising a civilian population.189  The accused also 
need not have specific victims in mind during the commission of the 
crime.190  Moreover, deaths from geographically and/or temporally 
separated sites have been aggregated to reach the required massive-
ness threshold, so long as each event falls within the overall exter-
mination episode charged.191 
 
3.3.2.1.2.  Mens Rea:  Knowledge of Mass Death and the 
Question of “Calculation” 
 
The ICTY and ICTR have both generally held that the mens rea of 
extermination requires that “the accused intended, by his acts or 
                                                      
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik (“Bosnia and Herzegovina”), Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judge-
ment, ¶ 716 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27. 2006). 
187 Krajišnik, Trial Judgement, supra note 186; accord, Martić, Trial Judgement, 
supra note 179, at ¶ 63; Lukić, Trial Judgement, supra note 148, at ¶ 938.  For exam-
ple, extermination convictions have resulted from incidents involving the killing of 
66 and 59 persons in cases at the ICTY.  Krajišnik, id. at ¶¶ 699, 720; Lukić, Trial 
Judgement, supra note 148, at ¶¶ 941, 945 (majority decision, Judge Van den 
Wyngaert dissenting). 
188 E.g., Ntakirutimana, Appeal Judgement, supra note 179, at ¶ 521 (“It is not 
an element of the crime of extermination that a precise identification of ‘certain 
named or described persons’ be established.”). 
189 See Krstić, Trial Judgement, supra note 59, at ¶ 500. 
190 Kayishema, Trial Judgement, supra note 69, at ¶ 145; see also M CHERIF 
BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1992) at 291 (cited by 
Kayishema, Trial Judgement, supra note 69, at ¶ 143 (“Extermination implies inten-
tional and unintentional killing.  The reason for the latter is that mass killing of a 
group of people involves planning and implementation by a number of persons 
who, though knowing and wanting the intended result, may not necessarily know 
their victims.  Furthermore, such persons may not perform the actus reus that pro-
duced the deaths, nor have specific intent toward a particular victim.”)); see also 
1996 ILC Draft Code, supra note 155, at 48, note 8 (noting that the crime against 
humanity of extermination “applies in situations in which some members of a 
group are killed while others are spared”). 
191 See Lukić, Trial Judgement, supra note 148, at ¶ 938 (citing Brđanin, Trial 
Judgement, supra note 181, at ¶ 391; aff’d Brđanin, Appeal Judgement, supra note 
185, at ¶¶ 471-72); see also Ntakirutimana, Appeal Judgement, supra note 179, at ¶ 
521. 
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omissions, either killing on a large scale, or the subjection of a wide-
spread number of people, or the systematic subjection of a number 
of people, to conditions of living that would lead to their deaths.”192  
There has been some disagreement between reviewing courts as to 
whether this standard includes gross criminal negligence, though it 
appears unlikely that a negligence standard would suffice.193  The 
ICTR Trial Chamber included gross negligence in its summary of 
the requisite mens rea for extermination in its Kayishema Judge-
ment;194 however, more recent ICTY jurisprudence suggests that 
recklessness, or dolus eventualis,195 is the threshold mens rea for exter-
mination196 as is the standard for crimes against humanity gener-
ally.197  As such, from a general standpoint, the consensus at the 
ICTY and ICTR seems to be that an accused must intentionally con-
tribute to the creation of mass death, and be at least subjectively 
aware that he was participating in group action that was objectively 
likely to result in mass death.198 
The Rome Statute adds another layer to the debate concerning 
the mens rea of extermination, defining the crime as including “the 
intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of 
access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction 
of part of a population.”199  As noted by Evelyne Schmid, the term 
“calculated” implies that the deprivation of access to basic socio-eco-
nomic rights must have been intended as a mechanism to bring 
                                                      
192 Stakić, Appeal Judgement, supra note 179, at ¶ 259, (citing Ntakirutimana, 
Appeal Judgement, supra note 179, at ¶ 522); accord Lukić, Trial Judgement, supra 
note 148, at ¶ 939. 
193 For an overview of the legal debate on the issue, see Brđanin, Trial Judge-
ment, supra note 181, at ¶¶ 392-95. 
194 Kayishema, Trial Judgement, supra note 69, at ¶ 144. 
195 This term was first adopted within ICL by the ICTY Appeal Chamber in its 
first judgement, where the term was defined as requiring “a state of mind in which 
a person, although he did not intend to bring about a certain result, was aware that 
the actions of the group were most likely to lead to that result but nevertheless will-
ingly took that risk.” Tadić, Appeal Judgement, supra note 107, at ¶ 220. 
196 See, e.g., Lukić, Trial Judgement, supra note 148, at ¶ 939 (“The mens rea of 
extermination is that the accused committed the act or omission with the intent to 
kill persons on a large scale or in knowledge that the deaths of a large number of 
people were a probable consequence of the act or omission.”). 
197 See, e.g., CASSESE, supra note 71, at 114–15. 
198 For a more detailed discussion of the mens rea of dolus eventualis, see Jared 
L. Watkins & Randle C. DeFalco, Joint Criminal Enterprise and the Jurisdiction of the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 193, 249–51 
(2010). 
199 Rome Statute, supra note 113, at art. 7(2)(b) (emphasis added). 
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about the destruction of part of a population.”200  This would seem 
to present a negative regression of the scope of extermination by un-
necessarily connecting it to similarly stringent mens rea language in 
the Genocide Convention.  This mens rea question has not been ad-
dressed in detail as of yet at the ICC and it is important to bear in 
mind that the Rome Statute is not a codification of customary ICL.  
For their part, the authors of the 2014 UN report on conditions in 
North Korea were of the opinion that for extermination: 
[t]he death of large numbers of people does not have to be 
the goal pursued by the perpetrators for the criminal intent 
requirement to be satisfied.  In the opinion of the Commis-
sion, it is sufficient that the perpetrators impose living con-
ditions in calculated awareness that such conditions will 
cause mass deaths in the ordinary course of events.201 
This interpretation seems to conform with the Rome Statute’s 
general definition of “intent” as being established in situations 
where “[i]n relation to a consequence, that person means to cause 
that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of 
events.”202  Such an approach would also avoid inconsistency be-
tween the mens rea requirement for one particular enumerated form 
of actus reus for extermination and the crime’s general status as a 
crime of indiscriminate mass killing. 
 
3.3.2.1.3.  Extermination and Famine Mortality 
 
As a crime of indiscriminate mass killing, the crime against hu-
manity of extermination is perhaps the most appropriate interna-
tional crime to apply to typical modern famine scenarios. This is be-
cause there is significant conceptual overlap between modern 
understandings of how famines kill and how causation issues are 
                                                      
200 SCHMID, supra note 19, at 155. 
201 2014 UN North Korea Report, supra note 46, at 1042.  The report cites the 
Lukić Trial Judgement, supra note 148, at ¶ 939 as authority, along with various 
scholars including, inter alia M. Cherif Bassiouni, Antonio Cassese and Evelyne 
Schmid. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: HISTORICAL 
EVOLUTION AND CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION 369 (2011); Antonio Cassese, Crimes 
against Humanity, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A 
COMMENTARY, 365 (Antonio Cassese, ed., 2002).  The report cites Schmid’s PhD 
work, which represents an earlier version of her book. See SCHMID, supra note 19. 
202 Rome Statute, supra note 113, at art. 30(2)(b) (emphasis added). 
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treated within extermination jurisprudence.  The judgement of the 
IMT convicting Hans Frank of, inter alia, extermination as a crime 
against humanity is illustrative of how this crime can properly re-
flect the culpability of individuals who place a group of victims in 
circumstances leading to mass death.  In convicting Frank, the Tri-
bunal judges noted that the arduous working conditions and Ger-
man expropriation of foodstuffs resulted in mass death through dis-
ease and starvation, finding that: 
The economic demands made on the General Government 
were far in excess of the needs of the army of occupation, and 
were out of all proportion to the resources of the country. 
The food raised in Poland was shipped to Germany on such 
a wide scale that the rations of the population of the occupied 
territories were reduced to the starvation level, and epidem-
ics were widespread. Some steps were taken to provide for 
the feeding of the agricultural workers who were used to 
raise the crops, but the requirements of the rest of the popu-
lation were disregarded. It is undoubtedly true, as argued by 
counsel for the defence, that some suffering in the General 
Government was inevitable as a result of the ravages of war 
and the economic confusion resulting there from. But the 
suffering was increased by a planned policy of economic ex-
ploitation.203 
This use of the civilian population of Poland as a source of in-
dentured labor is also similar to how the Khmer Rouge leadership 
used the civilian population of Cambodia in the service of the per-
ceived needs of the revolution.  In both Poland and Cambodia, this 
economic and social exploitation of the civilian population resulted 
in terrible living conditions marked by famine, disease, and starva-
tion and resulting in mass death.  Ultimately, the IMT found that 
Frank was “a willing and knowing participant in the use of terror-
ism in Poland; in the economic exploitation of Poland in a way 
which led to the death by starvation of a large number of people; in 
the deportation to Germany as slave labourers of over a million 
Poles; and in a programme involving the murder of at least three 
million Jews.”  As a result of this participation, the Tribunal found 
                                                      
203 IMT Judgement, supra note 17, at 297. 
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Frank guilty of the crimes against humanity204 of “murder, extermi-
nation, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts commit-
ted against civilian populations.”205 
The IMT Judgement against Frank demonstrates how extermi-
nation can be successfully prosecuted against individuals who par-
ticipate in enforcing famine conditions on a civilian population. The 
conviction of Frank also demonstrates how, as a crime of large-scale, 
yet impersonal killing, extermination accurately reflects how fam-
ines can kill amongst a civilian population indiscriminately. 
 
3.3.2.2.  Persecution 
 
Persecution is defined in the Rome Statute as the “intentional 
and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to interna-
tional law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.”206  
The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Krnojelac provided a similar defini-
tion, finding that: 
the crime of persecution consists of an act or omission which 
discriminates in fact and which: denies or infringes upon a 
fundamental right laid down in international customary or 
treaty law (the actus reus); and was carried out deliberately 
with the intention to discriminate on one of the listed 
grounds, specifically race, religion or politics (the mens 
rea).207 
 
3.3.2.2.1.  Actus Reus: Severe Infringement of a 
Fundamental Human Right 
 
The actus reus of persecution requires acts or omissions that se-
verely infringe a “fundamental right” guaranteed by international 
law.208  “Only gross or blatant denials of fundamental rights” qualify 
                                                      
204 Id. at 298. 
205 Id. at 29. 
206 Rome Statute, supra note 113, at art. 7(1)(g). 
207 Prosecutor v. Krnojelac (Foča), Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgement, ¶ 185 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 17, 2003) (quoting Krnojelac, Trial 
Judgement, supra note 131, at ¶ 43). 
208 See, e.g., Vasiljević, Trial Judgement, supra note 143, at ¶ 244. 
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as persecution.209  The suffering occasioned through the violation of 
the predicate fundamental right must be of “similar gravity” to 
other crimes against humanity.210  sectAdditionally, specific perse-
cutory acts must be alleged rather than general mistreatment of a 
targeted group,211 although various discriminatory acts not individ-
ually rising to the requisite gravity may cumulatively qualify as per-
secution.212 
Although international human rights law is predicated on the 
notion that all human beings are entitled to basic rights, not all such 
rights are considered “fundamental” and as such, not every targeted 
human rights violation amounts to persecution.  This general fact is 
especially true within the context of economic and social rights, such 
as the right to adequate food, which encompasses both fundamental 
core rights, as well as penumbral aspirational targets assigned to in-
dividual states and the global community at large.213 
The genesis of the modern right to adequate food is found in ar-
ticle 25(1) of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Uni-
versal Declaration), which acknowledged a universal “right to a 
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself 
                                                      
209 Id. The requirement that the right be “fundamental” replaced the former 
requirement under the Nuremberg Charter that persecution be committed in asso-
ciation with other crimes against humanity.  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blaškić (“Lašva 
Valley”), Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgement, ¶ 135 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia July 29, 2004). It is unclear however, whether the actus reus of persecu-
tion must independently constitute a criminal act.  See Separate Opinion of Judge 
Shahabuddeen, in Krnojelac, Appeal Judgement, supra note 207, at ¶¶ 5-7; cf. Pros-
ecutor v. Kvočka (“Omarksa, Keraterm & Trnopolje Camps”), Case No. IT-98-30/1-
T, Judgement, ¶ 186 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 2, 2001) 
(“[J]urisprudence from World War II trials found acts or omissions such as denying 
bank accounts, educational or employment opportunities, or choice of spouse to 
Jews on the basis of their religion, constitute persecution.  Thus, acts that are not 
inherently criminal may nonetheless become criminal and persecutorial if commit-
ted with discriminatory intent.”). 
210 See Lukić, Trial Judgement, supra note 148, at ¶ 993; see also Kordić, Appeal 
Judgement, supra note 150, at ¶ 102 (citing Blaškić, Appeal Judgement, supra note 
209, at ¶ 135); Krnojelac, Appeal Judgement, supra note 207, at ¶¶ 199, 221. 
211 See, e.g., id. at ¶ 246 (citing Kupreškić, Trial Judgement, supra note 160, at ¶ 
626); Krnojelac, Trial Judgement, supra note 131, at ¶ 433. 
212 Prosecutor v. Kvočka (“Omarksa, Keraterm & Trnopolje Camps”), Case No. 
IT-98-30/1-A, Judgement, ¶ 186 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 
28, 2005); Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgement, ¶ 179 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2009); Kupreškić, Trial Judgement, 
supra note 160, at ¶ 615(e); Krnojelac, Trial Judgement, supra note 131, at ¶ 434. 
213 For an overview of the human right to food, see Laura Niada, Hunger and 
International Law: The Far-Reaching Scope of the Human Right to Food, 22 CONN. J. INT’L 
L. 131 (2006). 
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and of his family, including food.”214  This nascent right to adequate 
food was solidified and elaborated on in Article 11 of the Interna-
tional Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
in 1966.215  Article 11 of the ICESCR divides the general human right 
to adequate food into two rights: (1) the largely aspirational right to 
an “adequate standard of living” including “adequate food” and the 
“continuous improvement” of living conditions; and (2) “the funda-
mental right of everyone to be free from hunger.”216  The core values 
of the right to adequate food, recognized in the ICESCR and Univer-
sal Declaration, are also considered “fundamental” in nature.217  
Thus, the core requirements of the right to adequate food cannot be 
dismissed as “mere” economic rights, but must be viewed as a criti-
cal ingredient necessary to protect the most basic human right of all: 
the right to life.218 
General support for the right to adequate food can also be found 
in numerous other human rights documents, including the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,219 Universal Declara-
tion on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition,220 Conventional 
                                                      
214 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25(1) 
(Dec. 10, 1948). 
215 G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, art. 11 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
216 Id. 
217 The right to food is considered a “foundational” right, inherent in the right 
to life. See UN Economic and Social Council, General Comment 12: Substantive Issues 
Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cul-
tural Rights, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5, ¶ 4 (May 12, 1999) [hereinafter General Com-
ment 12] (“The Committee affirms that the right to adequate food is indivisibly 
linked to the inherent dignity of the human person and is indispensable for the 
fulfilment of other human rights enshrined in the International Bill of Rights.”); see 
also Niada, supra note 213. 
218 See General Comment 12, supra note 217. 
219  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1(2), Dec. 19, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171, (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (“All peoples may, for their own 
ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any 
obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the prin-
ciple of mutual benefit, and international law.  In no case may a people be deprived 
of its own means of subsistence.”). 
220 Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition, U.N.G.A. 
res. 3180 (XXVIII) (Dec. 17, 1973); endorsed by U/N.G.A. Res. 3348 (XXIX), art. 1 
(Dec. 17, 1974) (“Every man, woman and child has the inalienable right to be free 
from hunger and malnutrition in order to develop fully and maintain their physical 
and mental faculties.”). 
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on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,221 and Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child.222  Both scholars and the UN Spe-
cial Rapporteur on the Right to Food have asserted that these instru-
ments and concordant state practice are sufficient to establish the 
human right to adequate food as customary international law.223 
As with most human rights, the right to adequate food refers to 
a broad spectrum of rights, ranging from well-established basic pro-
hibitions on state action to aspirational soft-law norms calling for 
affirmative state action to improve food security both domestically 
and abroad.224  There are three main responsibilities placed on states, 
those to: respect, ensure and fulfil.225  According to Laura Niada, when 
it comes to state implementation of the right to adequate food, 
“States have a duty to immediately realize the right to be free from 
hunger” but “[r]esponding to minimum needs, however, is only the 
baseline action necessary to comply with the right to food [because] 
States have an explicit duty to progressively implement the compre-
hensive right to food.”226  Thus, while it can be generally concluded 
that there exists a general human right to adequate food and a fun-
damental right to be free from hunger, it remains unclear where the 
demarcation line between “fundamental” and other types of food 
rights precisely sits.  Nonetheless, it appears clear that if a group is 
intentionally subjected to famine conditions as part of a targeted 
campaign against them, such acts would amount to a severe in-
fringement of the basic, fundamental human right to be free from 
                                                      
221 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, art. 
12(2), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) (requiring the 
provision of “adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation” for women). 
222 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 
24(2)(c) (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) (obligating State parties to “take appropri-
ated measures” to inter alia “combat disease and malnutrition, including within the 
framework of primary health care through, inter alia, the application of readily 
available technology and through the provision of adequate nutritious foods and 
clean drinking-water”). 
223 See Niada, supra note 213, at 173-76 (discussing the arguments for and 
against recognizing the right to adequate food as customary law and concluding 
that “there is a strong case for identifying a ‘modern’ international customary norm 
on the right to food, comprehensive and constantly updating” at 176); see also Spe-
cial Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Food, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/63/278 (Oct. 21, 2008) (asserting that the right to adequate 
food is customary international law). 
224 See generally, Niada, supra note 213 (discussing the right to food). 
225 See generally, id. 
226 Id. at 151-52. 
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hunger and would also implicate the most basic of all rights: the 
right to life. 
 
3.3.2.2.2.  Mens Rea:  Dolus Specialis 
 
The key to most persecution convictions is establishing the re-
quired mens rea of dolus specialis, or the “intent to commit the under-
lying act and to discriminate on political, racial or religious 
grounds.”227  This special discriminatory intent is the element that 
sets persecution apart from other crimes against humanity.228  For 
this stringent requirement to be satisfied, the perpetrator of perse-
cution must violate the fundamental rights of members of an inten-
tionally targeted political, racial or religious group.229  Thus, unlike 
the crime of genocide, political groups form a protected class for 
purposes of persecution, although it is often difficult to define the 
vital aspects of a political group.  The ICTR Trial Chamber has com-
mented that “[p]olitical grounds include party political beliefs and 
political ideology.”230  The practical difficulties inherent in such am-
biguity however, are largely avoided through the adoption of a sub-
jective approach to defining political groups, meaning that if the 
perpetrators targeted a group of victims based on their perceived 
group political identity, this suffices for purposes of persecution ap-
plicability.231  As such, it follows that liability is proper, even if an 
                                                      
227 Lukić, Trial Judgement, supra note 148, at ¶ 994 (citing Stakić, Appeal Judge-
ment, supra note 179, at ¶ 328). 
228 See, e.g., Mohamed Elewa Badar, From the Nuremberg Charter to the Rome 
Statute: Defining the Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, 5 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 73, 
137 (2004) (noting that it is the requirement of “discriminatory intent which sets the 
crime of persecution apart from other crimes against humanity”). 
229 See, e.g., Tadić, Trial Judgement, supra note 160, at ¶ 697 (stating that for 
persecution liability to attach, “it is evident that what is necessary is some form of 
discrimination that is intended to be and results in an infringement of an individ-
ual’s fundamental rights”). 
230 See, e.g., Kayishema, Trial Judgement, supra note 69, at ¶ 130. 
231 For example, the ICTY Trial Chamber found that persecutory acts commit-
ted by Serb paramilitary groups against local Muslim populations were committed 
on both religious and political grounds.  Krnojelac, Trial Judgement, supra note 131, 
at ¶ 22, note 56 (“The Trial Chamber understands that the term ‘non-Serb’ connotes 
both religious and political distinctions.”); accord Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. 
ICTR 99-52-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 1072 (Dec. 3, 2003) (finding the accused 
guilty of persecution for broadcasting hate-speech targeting both “the Tutsi ethnic 
group and the so-called ‘moderate’ Hutu political opponents who supported the 
Tutsi ethnic group.”  The Trial Chamber found that these attacks “essentially 
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alleged perpetrator of persecution acted with the intent to discrimi-
nate based on a false assumption regarding the political beliefs of 
associations of victims.232 
 
3.3.2.2.3.  Persecution and Famine 
 
In the context of famine, persecution could serve as a useful 
mechanism to reflect the culpability of those who forcibly subject 
disfavored political or other protected groups to famine conditions.  
Furthermore, the inclusion of political groups renders persecution 
potentially applicable to more modern famine scenarios than geno-
cide, representing a critically important distinction in many cases.  
This distinction is important because famines are often manipulated 
by powerful groups to shift the brunt of suffering onto less powerful 
ones, typically along political lines.233  As such, persecution provides 
a potentially useful legal acknowledgment of this dynamic and 
could signal instances where famine conditions, even if not com-
pletely caused by the perpetrator group, are manipulated to much 
more severely affect a particular group.  Prosecutions of persecution 
charges attendant to famine scenarios could also serve the purpose 
of further clarifying and advancing human rights law related to food 
access.  Even if the relevant adjudicators decline to enter a conviction 
for persecution predicated exclusively on the denial of the human 
right to be free from hunger, convictions could still be feasible, as 
                                                      
merged political and ethnic identity, defining their political target on the basis of 
ethnicity and political positions relating to ethnicity.”); cf. Nahimana, Appeal 
Judgement, supra note 150, at ¶¶ 986-88 (finding that “hate speech alone can 
amount to a violation of the rights to life, freedom and physical integrity of the 
human being.  Thus, other persons need to intervene before such violations can 
occur; a speech cannot, in itself, directly kill members of a group, imprison or phys-
ically injure them.”  The Chamber further found however, that “all [relevant hate] 
speeches took place in the context of a massive campaign of persecution directed at 
the Tutsi population of Rwanda, this campaign being also characterized by acts of 
violence” and thus such hate speech rose to the level of the crime against humanity 
of persecution). 
232 Krnojelac, Appeal Judgement, supra note 207, at ¶ 187 (finding that “a Serb 
mistaken for a Muslim may still be the victim of the crime of persecution”). 
233 For example, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe has been accused of 
manipulating the distribution of aid, especially food aid, to reward political allies 
and punish political opponents.  See, e.g., Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, Mugabe’s 
Zimbabwe, 2000-2009: Massive Human Rights Violations and the Failure to Protect, 32 
HUM. RIGHTS Q. 898 (2010). 
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famine conditions also very directly compromise other less contro-
versial rights, such as the basic human rights to life and bodily in-
tegrity. 
The case of Hans Frank again proves demonstrative within the 
context of the interaction between the enforcement of famine condi-
tions and international criminal culpability.  Along with finding 
Frank guilty of other crimes against humanity for his role in brutal-
izing the civilian population of Poland generally, Frank was also 
convicted for his role in the persecution and extermination of Euro-
pean Jews.234  The Tribunal specifically found that Frank partici-
pated in the Final Solution plan of the German Nazi party, pursuant 
to which Jews “were forced into ghettoes, subjected to discrimina-
tory laws, deprived of the food necessary to avoid starvation, and 
finally systematically and brutally exterminated.”235  This targeted 
persecution of Jews by the German Nazis is in many respects similar 
to the manner in which the Khmer Rouge leadership expressed dis-
dain for so-called “new” people, who were singled out amongst the 
civilian population and branded as less deserving of access to basic 
necessities such as food, water, shelter, healthcare and rest.236  Just 
as Jews in German-controlled portions of Europe were segregated 
and subjected to especially harsh conditions marked by lack of food 
and basic sanitation and the ever-present threat of extreme violence, 
Cambodians labelled as new people by the Khmer Rouge were sub-
ject to repeated forced relocation, especially harsh living and work-
ing conditions, and often provided with food rations that paled in 
comparison to even the meagre rations provided to other civilian 
workers.237 
 
 
                                                      
234 IMT Judgement, supra note 17, at 296-98. 
235 Id. at 116 (498 in original). 
236 The term “new” people denoted Cambodians who had lived in cities or 
other areas not controlled by the Khmer Rouge during the 1970-1975 civil war.  Un-
like the Nazi Party’s persecution of European Jews, the Khmer Rouge leadership 
did not seek the outright destruction of new people.  For a basic overview of the 
Khmer Rouge history, including a discussion of the concept “new” people, see 
KHAMBOLY DY, A HISTORY OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA 1975-1979 (2007).  For an 
analysis of the treatment of new people within the context of famine specifically, 
see DeFalco, Justice and Starvation in Cambodia, supra note 9. 
237 See DeFalco, Justice and Starvation in Cambodia, supra note 9. 
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3.3.2.3.  Other Inhumane Acts 
 
The crime against humanity of other inhumane acts is designed 
as a catch-all residual crime that can be used to prosecute acts that, 
while not satisfying all of the elements of a specific other crime 
against humanity, nevertheless rise to the same level of seriousness.  
To maintain this flexibility, the actus reus of other inhumane acts has 
been left intentionally amorphous to prevent creative technical eva-
sions of the law through the use of novel forms of harm causation.238  
An alleged inhumane act must be of “similar gravity” to that of other 
crimes against humanity in order to rise to the requisite level of se-
riousness.239  Moreover, specific inhumane acts must be demon-
strated at trial, rather than generally demonstrating mistreatment of 
a civilian population.240  The perpetrator of an inhumane act must 
possess a mens rea of at least dolus eventualis241 according to prevail-
ing jurisprudence at the ad hoc Tribunals, although the Rome Stat-
ute requires that the perpetrator “intentionally” cause the suffering 
of the victims.242 
                                                      
238 See, e.g., Kupreškić, Trial Judgement, supra note 160, at ¶ 563 (“The phrase 
[other inhumane acts] was deliberately designed as a residual category, as it was 
felt to be undesirable for this category to be exhaustively enumerated.  An exhaus-
tive categorization would merely create opportunities for evasion of the letter of 
the prohibition.”). 
239 E.g., Lukić, Trial Judgement, supra note 148, at ¶ 960 (“The act or omission 
[forming the actus reus of [inhumane acts] must have been of a seriousness similar 
to that of [other crimes against humanity].”); Kayishema, Trial Judgement, supra 
note 69, at ¶ 149 (“Since the Nuremberg Charter, the category [of other inhumane 
acts] has been maintained as a useful category for acts not specifically stated but 
which are of comparable gravity.”). 
240 Id. at ¶¶ 580-89 (observing that “[a]s far as counts for other inhumane acts 
are concerned the accused could be found guilty of crimes against humanity based 
on other inhumane acts” but ultimately finding that “the fundamental rights of 
both the accused, namely to be informed of the charges against him and to be in a 
position to prepare his defence in due time with complete knowledge of the matter, 
has been disregarded in relation to all the counts of crimes against humanity for 
other inhumane acts” thereby requiring their acquittal for inhumane acts). 
241 For a discussion of dolus eventualis, see supra at 39; supra note 195. 
242 E.g., Krnojelac, Trial Judgement, supra note 131, at ¶ 132 (“The required 
mens rea is met where the principal offender at the time of the act or omission, had 
the intention to inflict serious physical or mental suffering or to commit a serious 
attack on the human dignity of the victim, or where he knew that his act or omission 
was likely to cause serious physical or mental suffering or a serious attack upon 
human dignity and was reckless as to whether such suffering or attack would result 
from his act or omission.”) (citing Kayishema, Trial Judgement, supra note 69, at ¶ 
153); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgement, ¶ 56 (Int’l Crim. 
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3.3.2.3.1.  Acts of “Similar Gravity” 
 
In order to rise to a level of similar gravity to other crimes against 
humanity, alleged inhumane acts must cause injury to the “physical 
or mental integrity, health or human dignity” of affected victims.243  
Within international practice, accused have been found guilty of in-
humane acts as a crime against humanity for various acts of cruelty 
and abuse.  Examples pertinent to famine and hunger include: for-
cible transfer;244 confinement “on exposed ground without water, 
food or sanitary facilities” for five days;245 mistreatment and injuring 
of detainees;246 “psychological abuses, and confinement in inhu-
mane conditions”;247 injuries sustained during forced labor;248 and 
general physical assaults causing injury.249 
 
                                                      
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 25, 1999); cf. Rome Statute, supra note 113, at 
art. 7(1)(k). 
243 See Lukić, Trial Judgement, supra note 148, at ¶ 960 (the “act or omission 
must have caused serious mental or physical suffering or injury or constituted a 
serious attack on human dignity”) (citing Kordić, Appeal Judgement, supra note 
150, at ¶ 117) (subsequent citations omitted); see also Rome Statute, supra note 113, 
at art. 7(1)(k) (defining the crime as that of “[o]ther inhumane acts of a similar char-
acter [to other crimes against humanity,] intentionally causing great suffering, or 
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health”). 
244 See, e.g., Blagojević, Trial Judgement, supra note 186, at ¶ 810 (stating that 
forcible transfer is principally allowed). 
245 Bagilishema, Trial Judgement, supra note 71, at ¶¶ 490-94 (“The confine-
ment of a large number of people on exposed ground without water, food or sani-
tary facilities will amount to an inhumane act if the act is deliberate and its conse-
quences are serious mental or physical suffering or a serious attack on human 
dignity.”  The Chamber found “no evidence that any refugee actually died for lack 
of water or food. . . . Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that by the fifth day the 
physical suffering of most refugees must have been extreme.”  Furthermore, the 
Chamber found that placing the refugees in such horrible conditions “necessarily 
constitutes a serious attack on human dignity.”).  The accused was acquitted of in-
humane acts charges on evidentiary grounds.  Id. at ¶ 555. 
246 Kordić, Trial Judgement, supra note 101, at ¶¶ 256, 266-72. 
247 Kvočka, Trial Judgement, supra note 209, at ¶ 209. 
248 Prosecutor v. Naletilić (“Tuta & Štela”), Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgement, ¶ 
271 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2003). 
249 E.g., Tadić, Trial Judgement, supra note 160, at ¶ 697 (beatings of six prison-
ers). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss4/2
  
2017] Conceptualizing Famine  1175 
3.3.2.3.2.  Other Inhumane Acts and Famine 
 
The conditions of life associated with periods of famine involve 
a degree of suffering clearly comparable to that of other enumerated 
crimes against humanity.  Starving famine victims suffer severe, 
prolonged physical pain as their bodies break down and weaken.  
The longer term health implications for victims are similarly serious, 
as the physical stress of enduring periods of starvation is associated 
with lifelong and intergenerational negative health implications.250  
Famine conditions also routinely cause severe mental traumas and 
often involve breakdowns in most basic societal norms and mores, 
leading to wider negative implications for affected societies.251  For 
example, survivors of the Khmer Rouge period famine often suf-
fered physically from lack of food while also being forced to watch 
loved ones weaken, suffer and die from starvation.252  Importantly, 
the crime of other inhumane acts could also be used to recognize the 
suffering of victims of famine who ultimately survive, as the suffer-
ing of survivors is oft-ignored in discussions of famine in Cambodia 
and elsewhere. 
 
4.  CONCEPTUALIZING FAMINE AS A MODALITY OF HARM CAUSATION 
 
As demonstrated above, certain famine situations may involve 
the commission of a wide variety of international crimes.  Famine 
conditions may form part of a genocidal plan to destroy a national, 
religious, racial or ethnic group, as has been alleged by the ICC Of-
fice of the Prosecutor in regards to the situation in Darfur.253  Famine 
conditions enforced on a civilian population by an occupying power 
                                                      
250 See generally Roseboom, de Rooij, & Painter, supra note 64; Ó GRÁDA, supra 
note 2 at 45–68, 90–128.  For connections between the Khmer Rouge period, trauma 
and enduring mental health challenges for survivors and their families, see 
CAMBODIA’S HIDDEN SCARS: TRAUMA PSYCHOLOGY IN THE WAKE OF THE KHMER ROUGE 
(Beth Van Schaack et al. eds., 2011).  In particular, see Nigel P. Field, Intergenerational 
Transmission of Trauma Stemming from the Khmer Rouge Regime: An Attachment Per-
spective, in CAMBODIA’S HIDDEN SCARS: TRAUMA PSYCHOLOGY IN THE WAKE OF THE 
KHMER ROUGE, id. at 70, 71. 
251 See generally Ó GRÁDA, supra note 2. 
252 For an account of such an experience from a survivor of the Khmer Rouge 
period, see DeFalco, Justice and Starvation in Cambodia, supra note 9, at 46–48. 
253 See Al Bashir, Article 58 Application, supra note 43 (discussing how food 
deprivation was used as a weapon). 
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or starving prisoners of war could be characterized as the war crime 
of inhumane acts or wilfully causing great suffering.  Property-
based war crimes could also be implicated when military campaigns 
involve acts of pillaging or engage in scorched earth tactics.  Using 
starvation as a method of warfare is also itself a discrete war crime, 
one which UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon recently accused the 
Syrian government, rebel forces, and Islamic State militants of in re-
lation to the current food crisis in Madaya and other parts of Syria.254  
Finally, the creation or enforcement of famine conditions can often 
be accurately characterized as a widespread or systematic attack on 
a civilian population, making crimes against humanity a promising 
entry point for addressing general famine conditions outside the 
context of a targeted genocidal attack or armed conflict.  In particu-
lar, the crimes against humanity of extermination and other inhu-
mane acts could be combined to address the two main harms asso-
ciated with famine: mass death and the immense suffering of all 
victims, including survivors.  When disfavored political groups are 
denied fundamental human rights leading to disproportionate suf-
fering during a general famine, or creating a famine affecting only 
members of such group, the crime against humanity of persecution 
may be applicable. 
Thus, a wide variety of well-established international crimes 
may be implicated by particular famine scenarios.  Furthermore, de-
spite some disagreement concerning which particular aspects of ICL 
might be applicable, there appears to be relatively broad agreement 
amongst scholars and key international legal actors, such as the UN 
Commission of Inquiry for North Korea, and the ICC Office of the 
Prosecutor and Pre-Trial Chamber in relation to the situation in Dar-
fur, that there are significant opportunities within ICL, de lege lata, to 
pursue accountability for causing harm through the creation of fam-
ine conditions.255  Nonetheless, actual prosecutions directly address-
                                                      
254 See Full transcript of Secretary-General’s press encounter, supra note 129 
(addressing the situation in Madaya). 
255 See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 5 (demonstrating the role of international crim-
inal law in the context of famine); Kang, supra note 5 (describing food deprivation 
as a prosecutable crime against humanity); Edkins, supra note 5 DeFalco, Accounting 
for Famine, supra note 5 (discussing the international criminal dimensions of fam-
ine); Howard-Hassmann, supra note 5 (concluding that famine could be categorized 
as a crime against humanity). See also 2014 UN North Korea Report, supra note 46 
(finding state led food deprivation to be among the violations of human rights in 
North Korea). 
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ing famine remain elusive and the tendency to frame hunger, star-
vation and the spread of famine-related diseases as unfortunate by-
products or collateral damage of more familiar forms of atrocity and 
mass violence persists. 
This disconnect begs the question of why famine has continued 
to be relegated to the periphery of ICL when it has been the source 
of such massive suffering and death.  It is tempting to simply attrib-
ute the lack of famine-related ICL practice to the more general selec-
tivity and under-enforcement that plagues the entirety of the current 
international criminal justice regime.256  Yet the realities of ICL’s se-
lectivity and under-enforcement only go so far to explain this lack 
of engagement, as even in situations where ICL accountability has 
been pursued, such as in the former Yugoslavia, East Timor and 
Cambodia, questions of famine and civilian starvation have contin-
ued to be dealt with indirectly, if at all.  The ICTY Prosecutor de-
cided that famine conditions were not serious enough to warrant 
prosecutions.  The jurisdiction of the East Timorese SPSC was lim-
ited to a ten-month period when physical violence escalated at the 
tail end of a brutal multi-decade occupation.  The ECCC has thus 
far, focused primarily on torture and killing in prisons, the forced 
evacuation of Phnom Penh, and other more familiar atrocity crimes. 
There are various reasons beyond the general under-enforce-
ment of ICL that likely contribute the prevailing lack of direct en-
gagement with famine as a subject of ICL.  When viewed at a surface 
level, potential ICL accountability for famine can raise concerns of 
retroactive criminalization through the creation of new international 
crimes; watering down the stringency of ICL actus reus and mens rea 
requirements; imposing criminal liability for omissions or the impo-
sition of guilt by association; and the imposition of ICL accountabil-
ity for structurally caused socio-economic rights violations.  While 
such immediate reactions are not manifestly unreasonable, upon 
closer inspection, these challenges begin to appear less problematic.  
In fact, when scrutinized more closely, each of these concerns either 
merely reflects general challenges–such as causal overdetermination 
and group perpetration–inherent in virtually all atrocity crime pros-
ecutions, or is predicated on outdated underlying understandings 
                                                      
256 Under-enforcement and resultant selectivity represent major challenges to 
the efficacy and legitimacy of ICL.  There exists a large body of scholarship discuss-
ing these issues, which are outside the scope of this article.  For a thoughtful analy-
sis of how selectivity affects the legitimacy of ICL, see ROBERT CRYER, PROSECUTING 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: SELECTIVITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW REGIME 
(2005). 
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of famine itself.  Each of these categories of concern are addressed 
in turn, followed by broader observations concerning the aesthetic 
expectations of atrocity events. 
 
4.1.  The Specter of “New” International Crimes 
 
While many scholars have identified promising entry points 
within ICL for the pursuit of famine accountability, often such lia-
bility is discussed using terminology strongly suggestive of direct 
criminalization.257  This language, when taken out of context, sug-
gests that prosecutions of international crimes related to famine cau-
sation would necessarily require or amount to the creation of “new” 
international crimes.  Clearly if this were true, any such prosecution 
prior to the clear creation of new famine crimes would violate the 
principle of nullum crimen sine lege (“no crime without law”), a foun-
dational maxim of ICL.258  Such language thus confuses the issue, as 
scholars, including those utilizing such terminology, have identified 
significant opportunities to address modern famine scenarios utiliz-
ing extant ICL provisions.  It would not violate the principle of nul-
lum crimen sine lege to address novel factual scenarios utilizing well-
established international crimes and associated modes of liability. 
 
4.2.  Obscuring Causation and Mens Rea through the Passage of Time 
 
Causal chains connecting famine conditions to those ultimately 
responsible for causing them can remain difficult to identify even 
when rather direct, because the harms associated with famine typi-
cally occur attritively over time.  The slow and insidious nature of 
famine is a paradigmatic example of the phenomenon Helen Fein 
has referred to as “genocide by attrition.”259  Everita Silina and the 
late Sheri Rosenberg have argued that such attritive processes form 
a major, oft-overlooked aspect of genocides and other mass killing 
                                                      
257 See, e.g., DE WAAL, supra note 5; Marcus, supra note 5; Edkins, supra note 5; 
Bashi, supra note 5; Howard-Hassmann, supra note 5. 
258 For example, this is the position taken by Howard De Nike. See De Nike, 
supra note 37. 
259 Fein, supra note 6. 
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events.260  In order to resist the temptation to resort to inaccurate, 
static understandings of genocide and mass killing, Rosenberg ar-
gues that genocide is better understood as dynamic, evolving “pro-
cesses” rather than static events.261  While Fein, Silina and Rosenberg 
present their work within the rubric of genocide, they do so using a 
non-legal definition of the term that roughly correlates with the 
terms atrocity and mass violence as they are used within ICL schol-
arship, focusing on the production of mass suffering and death.262  
Diana Sankey has similarly identified a broader failure within tran-
sitional justice practices to recognize and address what she refers to 
as “subsistence harms.”263  Sankey defines subsistence harms as 
“deprivations of the physical, mental and social needs of human 
subsistence, perpetrated against individuals or populations in situ-
ations of armed conflict or as an act of political repression, where the 
perpetrator acts with intent or with knowledge of the inevitable con-
sequences of such deprivations.”264 
The observations of Sankey, Fein, Rosenberg and Silina, con-
cerning the reality that more insidious, often socio-economic means 
of mass killing are integral to atrocity and genocide events, raise 
broader questions related to the relationship between ICL and eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights.  Famine situations are often 
viewed as products of economic, social and cultural rights viola-
tions, especially the right to adequate food.265  While such an associ-
ation is not necessarily problematic, linking famine with economic, 
social and cultural rights can lead to the importation of a broader 
tendency to view the violation of such rights as being inherently 
                                                      
260 See Rosenberg & Silina, supra note 6. 
261 Sheri P. Rosenberg, Genocide Is a Process, Not an Event, 7 GENOCIDE STUD. & 
PREV. 16 (2012). 
262 Fein’s article begins with the statement that “[g]enocide by attrition occurs 
when a group is stripped of its human rights, political, civil and economic. This 
leads to deprivation of conditions essential for maintaining health, thereby produc-
ing mass death.” Fein, supra note 6, at 10.  Rosenberg meanwhile, states that “gen-
ocide is a process, a collective cataclysm, that relies more heavily—than currently 
appreciated—on indirect methods of destruction for its success.  It is the excessive 
focus on violent deaths and a preoccupation with the numbers of victims that have 
obscured alternative means of annihilation and have thereby missed the signals of 
unfolding tragedies.”  Rosenberg, supra note 261, at 18. 
263 Sankey, supra note 14. 
264 Id. at 122. 
265 See, e.g., Kearney, supra note 40. 
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structural in nature and hence, excluded from the purview of ICL.266  
This assumption has been increasingly called into question by schol-
ars.267 
Misunderstandings of the dynamics of famine causation repre-
sent a prime example of this tendency towards broad generaliza-
tions concerning the divide between direct and structural causation.  
Certain famines, such as the Khmer Rouge era famine in Cambodia, 
can be very directly caused.268  Famines, by definition, kill through 
attrition, as victims slowly weaken and die.  In fact, even during the 
most virulent famine episodes, relatively few victims die from actual 
starvation, but more often from the spread of famine-related dis-
eases as society breaks down, the medical sector becomes over-
whelmed and desperation sets in.269  As such, famines represent 
clear examples of mass killing as a dynamic process of attrition, ra-
ther than a discrete event, and fit within Sankey’s definition of sub-
sistence harms.  These facts, that famine events kill attritively 
through insidious means and over periods of time, have likely 
tended to obscure relevant chains of causation, contributing to the 
widely-held assumption that famine harms are necessarily excluded 
from the reach of ICL.  Such an assumption however, represents a 
generalization that does not always hold true.  Certain famines, such 
as the Khmer Rouge famine in Cambodia and recent North Korean 
                                                      
266 For a discussion of this tendency to view economic, social and cultural 
rights as being structurally excluded from the purview of ICL, see SCHMID, supra 
note 19, at 22–40. For a widely cited argument that there is pressing need to address 
economic and social justice issues in transitional justice efforts more generally, see 
Louise Arbour, Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition, 40 NYU J . INT’L 
L. & POL. 1 (2007). 
267 See, e.g., Evelyne Schmid & Aoife Nolan, “Do No Harm”? Exploring the Scope 
of Economic and Social Rights in Transitional Justice, 8 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 362 
(2014).  Schmid and Nolan observe that in “the use of ESR [economic and social 
rights] terminology in transitional justice literature and practice, we observed a ten-
dency to view ESR violations as necessarily structural while considering civil and 
political rights violations to be discrete abuses.”  They further contend that the “risk 
of this approach is that it ignores that many ESR violations occur during conflict 
and that such violations can be discrete rather than structural.”  Id. at 10–11. 
268 Various scholars, including the author, have made this specific argument 
elsewhere.  See generally DeFalco, Justice and Starvation in Cambodia, supra note 9; 
James A. Tyner & Stian Rice, To Live and Let Die: Food, Famine, and Administrative 
Violence in Democratic Kampuchea, 1975–1979, 48 POLIT. GEOGR. 1 (2015).  For more 
general accounts of the Khmer Rouge periods that discuss famine issues, see, e.g., 
ELIZABETH BECKER, WHEN THE WAR WAS OVER: CAMBODIA AND THE KHMER ROUGE 
REVOLUTION, rev’d ed. (1998); BEN KIERNAN, THE POL POT REGIME: RACE, POWER, AND 
GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE, 1975-79, (3d ed. 2008). 
269 See Ó GRÁDA, supra note 2, at 90–128. 
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famines, can be products of quite direct causal forces attributable to 
a discrete and identifiable set of individuals.  Indeed, in certain cir-
cumstances, the causal links between famine conditions and those 
responsible for creating them could be stronger and more direct 
than for more traditional atrocity crimes of direct violence.270 
Along with rendering causal links less immediately visible, the 
fact that famines cause slow deterioration, rather than sudden, vio-
lent harm, may also help to obscure the mens rea of those responsible 
for causing famine.  Concern over the degree to which famine con-
ditions were foreseeable to those who caused them and concomitant 
mens rea issues have been raised regularly by scholars.271  When one 
views famines as processes of slow killing and traumatization, it be-
comes less difficult to also view the mens rea of individuals impli-
cated in the creation of famine as evolving over time.  When viewed 
in this way, a single famine event that starts as the product of non-
criminal negligent action, may evolve into one that is enforced reck-
lessly, knowingly, intentionally, or even purposefully over time as 
those responsible are made aware of famine conditions and react ac-
cordingly.  Thus, famines are best understood as delivery systems 
of mass trauma and death that evolve dynamically and as such, may 
or may not begin by implicating ICL, but over time may evolve into 
atrocities entailing individual ICL accountability. 
 
4.3.  Group Perpetration and Causal Overdetermination 
 
Famines are overwhelmingly brought about through the coordi-
nated actions of highly organized groups, rather than individuals.  
Such groups, which often include state actors, transform general 
food shortages or production shortfalls into mass famines.  This was 
the case in Cambodia, where the Khmer Rouge leadership inherited 
                                                      
270 For example, in the context of the Khmer Rouge, violence carried out at the 
behest of local Khmer Rouge officials could be unsanctioned by the central leader-
ship, or even against party policy, while famine conditions were primarily a result 
of the leadership’s socio-economic policies.  See generally DeFalco, Justice and Star-
vation in Cambodia, supra note 9. 
271 For example, Solomon Bashi, analyzing potential ICL famine accountability 
of former Khmer Rouge leaders, concludes that holding such leaders criminally re-
sponsible “for starvation will certainly be a challenge.  The accused will likely claim 
that they were unaware of the conditions at the local level.  This defense can be 
especially effective against a charge like starvation, in which the resulting deaths 
are slow and indirect.”  Bashi, supra note 5, at 69. 
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a nation ravaged by five years of civil war and whose food produc-
tion had been significantly decreased.  Indeed, the Khmer Rouge 
portrayed their brand of agrarian socialism as a source of abundant 
food in propaganda materials while they fought a bitter civil war 
with the US-backed Lon Nol government.272  Once in power, the 
Khmer Rouge regime enacted a series of social and economic poli-
cies that combined to trigger and continually worsen a nationwide 
famine.273  These policies operated interactively to cause and contin-
ually worsen famine conditions.  All of these policies emanated from 
the top Khmer Rouge leadership and were enforced throughout the 
countryside by local commanders, cadres and party militias through 
extreme violence. 
As a result of the reality of these overlapping, interactive causal 
dynamics and group causation, it is tempting to dismiss famine sit-
uations as too causally overdetermined for a criminal law paradigm, 
grounded in individual agency, to be applicable.  Yet, in this regard, 
famines do not present any new challenges to the pursuit of ICL ac-
countability following atrocity events.  Atrocities are virtually al-
ways heavily overdetermined products of concerted group behav-
ior, and individual perpetrators considered most responsible for 
atrocity crimes are routinely far removed from the physical perpe-
tration of such atrocities.274  This fact, and the reality that atrocities 
are committed almost exclusively by groups rather than individuals, 
have not been viewed as impediments to the pursuit of international 
criminal justice since the IMT famously pronounced that interna-
tional crimes are “committed by men, not by abstract entities.”275  
Despite the fact that this pronouncement elides the fact that such 
“men” rarely, if ever, commit such crimes alone, problems of causal 
overdetermination and group commission have not generally stood 
                                                      
272 See DeFalco, Justice and Starvation in Cambodia, supra note 9, at 50–54. 
273 See id.  Examples of key policies include bans on private cooking and eating, 
bans on private ownership of food or the creation of private subsistence gardens, 
arduous forced labor conditions, bans on foraging for wild food sources, state ex-
propriation of “surplus” rice to fund revolutionary projects, the complete denial of 
competent medical care, the expulsion of all foreigners, including food aid workers 
and organizations, and a complete ban on freedom of movement for civilians to 
move to areas with more food or flee the country altogether. 
274 For a discussion of some of the challenges overdetermination presents to 
ICL, see James G. Stewart, Overdetermined Atrocities, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1189 
(2012).  
275 See IMT Judgement, supra note 17, at 223. 
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in the way of ICL prosecutions to date.276  Thus, although famine 
scenarios do present practical challenges to the imputation of indi-
vidual criminal responsibility, such challenges are not in any way 
unique to the subject of famine, but rather are near-universal in the 
pursuit of criminal accountability for atrocities.277 
 
4.4.  The Commission/Omission Distinction and Concerns of 
Criminalizing Bad Policy Decisions 
 
If famines are understood according to outdated, causally neu-
tral models grounded in the language of natural disaster, or at least 
the failure to respond thereto, ICL accountability for famine can 
raise concerns of the imposition of criminal liability predicated on 
some mix of omission liability and the criminalization of mere bad 
policy decisions.278 
The concern that the imposition of ICL accountability predicated 
wholly on the failure of an accused to act to prevent famine is largely 
grounded in outdated underlying notions of the causal dynamics 
involved in famine creation.  In the vast majority of modern famine 
scenarios, famine conditions are caused by affirmative actions and 
policymaking, rather than merely allowed to happen.  Furthermore, 
even in instances where unforeseen or naturally occurring fluctua-
tions in food production have some role in contributing to the onset 
of famine, typically it is only when relevant actors take affirmative 
                                                      
276 This is not to suggest that problems of overdetermination and group com-
mission have not been major recurring obstacles to the development of ICL.  For 
discussions of some of the issues generally raised in this regard, see, e.g., Mark A. 
Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atroc-
ity, 99 NORTHWEST. U. L. REV. 539 (2004); André Nollkaemper, Systemic Effects of In-
ternational Responsibility for International Crimes, 8 ST. CLARA J. INT’L L. 313 (2010); 
Mark A. Drumbl, Accountability for System Criminality, 8 ST. CLARA J. INT’L L. 373 
(2010); Darryl Robinson, International Criminal Law as Justice, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
699 (2013); Saira Mohamed, Deviance, Aspiration, and the Stories We Tell: Reconciling 
Mass Atrocity and the Criminal Law, 124 YALE L.J. 1628 (2015). 
277 Indeed, this disconnect between municipal and international criminality 
has led certain scholars, such as Mark Drumbl, to question the suitability of a liberal 
criminal law framework grounded in municipal conceptions of crime and criminal-
ity, to atrocity situations.  See, e.g., MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007).  Drumbl has described the uncritical adoption of a lib-
eral criminal law model of justice as amounting to the construction of law on “bor-
rowed stilts.”  Id. at 44. 
278 These concerns were raised by Alejandro Chehtman and Stephen Toope in 
discussions with the author, who is grateful for their insightful feedback. 
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steps that such famines begin to kill on a large scale.  Most often, 
such affirmative acts include some combination of acts affecting 
food production or distribution, along with restrictions on the abil-
ity of victims to engage in coping behavior, such as migration or re-
sorting to alternative food sources. 
In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge regime both triggered famine 
by expropriating rice from the population and enforcing hard labor, 
and maintained starvation conditions by expelling all foreign aid 
workers, refusing to accept international assistance and preventing 
starving victims from fleeing or foraging for alternative food 
sources.279  In Darfur, famine conditions appear to have been manu-
factured by the Khartoum government.280  In Somalia, famine only 
killed victims in large numbers in areas controlled by Al Shabaab 
militants, who routinely murdered foreign aid workers and actively 
prevented civilians from fleeing to areas with greater food availabil-
ity.281  In a more general sense, famines tend to occur only within 
certain parts of areas affected by naturally-caused reductions in ag-
gregate food production, such as droughts or floods.282  It is this 
basic fact, that occurrences of famine cannot be directly correlated 
with decreases in aggregate food production, that has led to a shift 
in how famines are conceptualized.283 
Yet, even when famines are understood as products of positive 
acts, rather than omissions, such acts risk being dismissed as mere 
bad policy, rather than framed as potentially criminal methods of 
harm causation.  Again, such a concern can be both viewed as uni-
versal to all atrocity crimes and predicated on an assessment of 
knowledge and culpability at a particular moment in time, rather 
than as constantly evolving in relation to events as they unfold.  
First, one can characterize much of ICL as being dedicated to the 
prosecution of individuals for their contributions to bad policies.  
                                                      
279 See generally DeFalco, Justice and Starvation in Cambodia, supra note 9. 
280 See, e.g., de Waal, Reflections, supra note 6; Reeves, supra note 12. 
281 See, e.g., BRYDEN, supra note 11; Jillions, supra note 128; Ohlin, supra note 5. 
It should be noted that the Somali government and its US backers may have also 
contributed to the worsening of famine in areas controlled by Al Shabaab.  See So-
malia 2011 famine Was a U.S.-Created War Crime, supra note 11. 
282 For example, bad weather affected food production throughout Southeast 
Asia during the reign of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, yet true famine occurred 
solely within Cambodia and did not affect similarly situated countries, such as 
Thailand, Vietnam or Laos.  See DeFalco, Justice and Starvation in Cambodia, supra 
note 9. 
283 See, e.g., Sen, supra note 4; DE WAAL, FAMINE CRIMES, supra note 4; Devereux, 
Introduction, supra note 3; Ó GRÁDA, supra note 2. 
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The Final Solution plan was official, if secret, Nazi policy.  A policy 
decision was also made to exterminate Muslim men and boys in Sre-
brenica.  While these examples are admittedly extreme, they put into 
stark relief the fact that characterizing actions causing mass harm as 
“policy” decisions does not move the needle in terms of an assess-
ment of whether such actions were criminal in nature.  Indeed, one 
of the unique aspects of ICL generally is that it routinely criminal-
izes actions and policies set by state actors. 
Second, the characterization of ICL-based famine accountability 
as amounting to the criminalization of policy decisions, even poor 
ones, risks oversimplifying mens rea assessments by focusing on a 
particular, pre-famine moment in time when policy decisions are 
first made as the sole moment when mens rea should be assessed.  
Famines may be triggered by negligent or hopelessly incompetent 
governance and policymaking.  In such scenarios, those responsible 
for such bad policy clearly do not commit any international crime 
by simply being awful at their vocation.  Such policies may violate 
human rights, but may remain non-criminal from the perspective of 
ICL for some time.  When however, famine conditions begin to set 
in and victims begin to starve and die, the mens rea of those respon-
sible for bringing about such conditions very nearly always evolves 
in relation to events as they unfold.  The Khmer Rouge leaders may 
have been simply grossly incompetent and overly optimistic when 
they declared that Cambodia would triple rice production in a single 
year.  When famine resulted from this and other disastrous policies 
however, and continually decimated the civilian population, the re-
gime’s leadership at some point moved from mere negligence to wil-
ful blindness, reckless disregard or sheer uncaring knowledge vis-
à-vis the reality that their actions were quite directly resulting in the 
brutalization of the entire civilian population and the deaths of hun-
dreds of thousands of Cambodians.  Thus, the label of “policy” does 
not preclude the imposition of ICL accountability for famine, but 
merely reflects the fact that policy choices can become criminal over 
time if they wreak sufficient havoc and yet continue to be enforced 
nonetheless. 
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5.  CONCLUSION 
 
Famine events are not inherently atrocities.  They are periods of 
mass suffering and death.  However, powerful individuals and 
groups can, and regularly do, commit international atrocity crimes 
by enforcing famine conditions on victim populations.  Nonetheless, 
famines fail to exhibit the forms of spectacular violence and result-
ant suffering that have come to be associated with the commission 
of atrocities, from the Holocaust to more recent atrocities, such as 
those in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Darfur and Syria. 
All of the various potential roadblocks to ICL famine accounta-
bility, ranging from fears of retroactive criminalization to the impo-
sition of criminal liability for structural socio-economic rights viola-
tions, can be viewed as by-products of this larger, aesthetic issue.  
Traditional forms of mass atrocity, committed through widespread 
acts of horrific interpersonal violence, do not suffer from such aes-
thetic challenges, as they are easily and viscerally understandable as 
“criminal” in nature.  Thus, when a mass grave filled with bodies 
riddled with bullets or exhibiting other marks of physical assault is 
discovered, such bodies are intuitively categorized as victims of in-
ternational crimes.  When bodies are decimated by hunger and fam-
ine-related diseases, the immediate causal dynamics involved to 
produce such suffering are not so arrestingly, viscerally criminal.  As 
such, the main barrier standing in the way of ICL-based famine ac-
countability appears to be one grounded in perception, aesthetics, 
and visibility politics, rather than technical questions of legality and 
feasibility.284 
This broader question, of just what is meant by the term “atroc-
ity” and how aesthetic expectations and other visibility politics 
shape ICL practice and discourse, goes beyond the question of fam-
ine accountability and merits greater investigation.  Absent a much 
broader reimagining of the hallmarks of atrocities and the nature of 
international criminality, more modest steps could be undertaken in 
relation to famine itself as a potential subject of ICL.  One such step 
                                                      
284 This argument is made, albeit indirectly and in related, but different con-
texts by Sonja Starr (in relation to potential ICL accountability for grand corruption) 
and Evelyne Schmid (in relation to potential overlaps between ICL and violations 
of economic, social and cultural rights generally).  See Starr, supra note 22, at 1260–
67; SCHMID, supra note 19, at 22–40.  This invisibility of famine can also be under-
stood as part of a broader blindness to economic and social issues within the entire 
field of transitional justice.  See Miller, supra note 41. 
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could be to re-conceptualize famines as potentially criminal means, 
rather than crimes in and of themselves.  Presenting famines in this 
way, as modalities of harm production, could help better situate the 
subject matter of famine within the architecture of modern interna-
tional criminal justice and resist aesthetic biases predicated on visi-
bility politics and assumptions concerning the forms that atrocity 
events may take. 
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